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Abstract 
 
The Myners Report will have a number of significant consequences for pension fund 
management and performance measurement in the UK. 
 
It changes the way in which assets are selected. The strategic asset allocation will have 
overriding importance in pension fund management. Asset classes will be selected on the basis of 
their match with liabilities in terms of correlation and volatility, rather than on the basis of 
expected return. Every pension scheme will have a scheme-specific funding standard that reflects 
the maturity structure of the liabilities of the scheme. 
 
It changes the role of the fund manager. A hierarchical relationship will develop between the 
investment advisor, actuary and fund manager. The investment advisory function assumes a 
primacy over the actuarial and fund management functions. 
 
It changes the way investment performance is measured. Liability-driven performance 
measurement and attribution will replace the existing performance measurement framework in the 
UK. The passively managed components of the pension fund  will be judged on the costs of 
implementation. Only the performance of the surplus assets will be measured on a conventional 
basis. 
 
The Myners Report is summarised and an illustrative statement of investment principles and 
transparency statement are presented.  
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Executive Summary 
 
Myners and the MFR 
 
· Following the Myners Report on Institutional Investment in the UK, the Minimum 
Funding Requirement, introduced by the 1995 Pensions Act, will be replaced by a scheme-
specific funding standard and a regime of transparency and disclosure 
 
· Annual transparency statements will be sent to members and the Statement of Investment 
Principles will be strengthened 
 
· Investment objectives will have to be consistent with the need to deliver the pension 
promise 
 
· The new regime is expected to come into force in 2005 
 
Fund Management after Myners 
 
· Defined benefit schemes are managed using asset- liability management 
 
· The scheme-specific funding standard involves a strategic asset allocation that minimises a 
loss function of surplus and contribution risks 
 
· Surplus risk is minimised by ensuring full funding on a continuous basis and matching as 
closely as possible the volatility of the assets and liabilities 
 
· The volatility of the liabilities depends on the volatilities of real earnings growth, 
mortality, inflation, and interest rates. Of particular importance is the choice of discount 
factor and its volatility 
 
· Contribution risk deals with the volatility of contributions into the pension scheme. It can 
be lowered by investing in lower volatility assets, but at the cost of raising average 
contributions 
 
· The optimal asset allocation depends on the weight attached to contribution risk. As the 
pension fund matures, the weight in index- linked bonds will increase 
 
The Roles of the Investment Advisor, Actuary and Fund Manager after 
Myners 
 
· To avoid inconsistencies, the investment advisory function is separated from the actuarial 
and fund management functions. In future, pure fund management plays a subordinate role 
 
· The length of the investment management contract is related to the actuarial valuation 
cycle 
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Performance Measurement after Myners 
 
· Liability-driven performance benchmarks replace peer-group benchmarks  
 
· Possible benchmarks for final salary pension schemes include real earnings growth, price 
inflation, GDP growth, the growth rate in consumption expenditure in retirement and the 
discount rate for discounting future liabilities  
 
· Liability-driven performance attribution (LPDA) is used for asset-liability managed 
portfolios  
 
· The assets of a pension fund are divided between liability-driven assets and general assets 
that constitute the surplus in the fund  
 
· The LPDA has four components: the rate of return on general assets, the rate of return on 
liability-driven assets due to stock selection, the rate of return on liability-driven assets due 
to market timing and the rate of return from a funding mismatch 
 
 
Illustration 
 
· We provide some illustrative pension fund asset allocations based on employer attitudes to 
surplus and contribution risk and historical correlations. 
 
· Historical experience in the UK shows that the asset classes most highly correlated with 
pension liabilities are property, cash, and index- linked and international fixed- income 
bonds 
 
· If it is believed that the future will be like the past, these assets will play a significant role 
in portfolios that minimise surplus and contribution risk.  
 
· We show that current asset allocations in UK pension funds, dominated as they are by 
equity, do not minimise surplus and contribution risks. 
 
· We stress that these results are purely illustrative and are not intended as a specific 
recommendation concerning future asset allocations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Until the Myners Report, pension fund management in the UK had little in practice to do 
with the structure of pension liabilities.  Despite paying lip service to asset-liability studies 
and so forth, pension fund investment was about the selection of investments that either 
maximised the expected return on the pension fund or was designed to beat some measure of 
the peer-group performance of other pension fund managers.  Investment performance 
targets of the following kind were common: To exceed the 45th percentile of the CAPS Size 
Code A (the largest pension funds in the CAPS universe) cum property universe over rolling 
five-year periods.  This meant investing in equities with their high historical returns and UK 
pension funds still have the highest weighting in equities of any pension funds in the world. 
  
The Myners Report is going to lead to a radical change in pension fund investment in the UK. In 
will come instructions to choose strategic asset allocations that depend on both the characteristics 
of individual schemes and those schemes’ sponsor’s attitude to surplus and contribution risks.  
Asset classes will be chosen for their high degree of correlation with the growth rate in pension 
liabilities which, in turn, is linked to earnings growth.  
 
These asset allocations are likely to be chosen by specialist investment advisors, rather than fund 
managers whose role is reduced to the subsidiary one of stock selection and market timing for the 
assets that constitute the surplus in schemes. The liability-driven assets will most likely be 
passively managed. Actuarial consultants cease to give investment advice and instead concentrate 
on valuing the liabilities and choosing the contribution rate into the scheme that is consistent with 
the optimal asset allocation that minimises the chances of scheme deficits emerging. 
 
Performance measurement also changes. Out goes performance targets that seek to maximise 
return or beat the peer group. Liability-driven performance attribution (LPDA) becomes more 
common and pension fund assets are divided between liability-driven assets and the general assets 
that constitute the surplus in the fund. 
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2. Myners and the MFR 
 
In March 2001 the H M Treasury-sponsored review of institutional investment chaired by Paul 
Myners, chief executive of Gartmore, was published. Its recommendations were immediately 
accepted in full by the government (Department of Social Security and H M Treasury (2001)). 
The report called for a new approach to institutional investment, identified a series of current 
distortions to effective decision-making, and suggested ways of tackling them.  
 
One of the key features of the report was its proposal to replace the Minimum Funding 
Requirement (MFR) for pension funds (introduced by the 1995 Pensions Act) with a long-term 
scheme-specific funding standard in the context of a strong regime of transparency and disclosure. 
The report also proposed a set of additional measures to strengthen protection: 
 
· a recovery plan for returning schemes to full funding, 
 
· a statutory duty of care on the scheme actuary, 
 
· stricter conditions on the voluntary wind-up of a scheme where the employer remains 
solvent (e.g., the liabilities will have to include the actual cost of winding up the scheme 
and the actual cost of buying annuities to secure pensions in payment), and 
 
· an extension of the fraud compensation scheme: the level of compensation for fraud will 
be increased to cover not simply the MFR liabilities as at present, but the full cost of 
securing members’ accrued benefits (or the amount of the loss from fraud, whichever is 
the lesser). 
 
The government argued that: ‘These proposals will provide protection for members of all defined 
benefit schemes and will encourage an intelligent and thought-through approach to planning 
investment and contributions policy. They do not distort investment as the MFR does, because 
they do not involve the valuation of liabilities using statutory reference assets which create 
artificial incentives for schemes to invest in those assets. Employers that wish to go on offering 
defined benefit schemes will find it easier to do so under these proposals. At the same time, the 
proposals will make it more difficult for those that wish to walk away from the pension promises 
that they have made’.  
 
 
Transparency Statement 
 
Each year, every defined benefit pension fund would be required to publish a transparency 
statement  that presents the following information: 
 
· the current value of its assets and in what asset classes they were invested, 
 
· the assumptions  used to determine its liabilities, 
 
· planned future contributions, 
 
· its planned asset allocation for the following year or years, 
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· the assumed returns  and assumed volatilities of those returns for each asset class 
sufficient to meet the liabilities, 
 
· a justification by the trustees of the reasonableness of both their asset allocation and the 
investment returns assumed in the light of the circumstances of the fund and of the 
sponsor, and  
 
· an explanation of the implications of the volatility of the investment values for possible 
underfunding, and a justification by trustees of why this level of volatility is judged to be 
acceptable. 
 
The Importance of the Strategic Asset Allocation 
 
In respect of pension fund management, the report argued that the strategic asset allocation 
decision (the selection of key asset categories, such as cash, equities, bonds and property, as 
opposed to individual securities) was a significantly under-resourced activity. Empirical evidence 
(e.g., Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann (1999)) shows that the SAA dominates the investment 
performance of institutional investors.  
 
Clarity of Objectives and Timescale 
 
There was also a lack of clarity about objectives, with the objectives set having little apparent 
connection with the ultimate objective of the pension fund to deliver pensions to scheme 
members.  A particularly unfortunate objective that pension funds have been set since the 
beginning of the 1980s is that of beating the peer-group median fund manager. Empirical 
evidence (e.g., Blake, Lehmann and Timmermann (2002)) indicates that this has encouraged 
herding by fund managers.  Another issue relates to the timescale over which fund managers’ 
performance is assessed.  Trustees have come to expect long-term investment objectives to be met 
over very short horizons and this, in turn, has resulted in short-termism, the pressure on the 
companies in which fund managers invest to generate short-term profits at the expense of their 
own long-term investment programmes.  
 
Statement of the Principles of Institutional Investment 
 
The report made a number of proposals to deal with these distortions. The key proposal is the 
introduction of a statement of the principles of institutional investment1, incorporating a short set 
of clear principles of investment decision-making. In respect of the management of funds of 
defined benefit pension schemes, the statement should deal with the following issues: 
 
· Where trustees elect to take investment decisions, they must have sufficient expertise to be 
able to evaluate critically any advice they take. 
 
· Objectives for the overall fund should be clear and should not be expressed in terms which 
have no relationship to the fund’s liabilities, such as performance relative to other pension 
funds, or to a market index.  
 
                                                 
1 This is different from the statement of investment principles already required by the 1995 Pensions Act. 
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· Strategic asset allocation decisions should receive a level of attention (and, where relevant, 
advisory or management fees) that fully reflect the contribution they can make towards 
achieving the fund’s investment objective. Asset allocation should reflect the fund’s own 
characteristics, not the average allocation of other funds.  
 
· Trustees should agree with both internal and external investment managers an explicit 
written mandate covering agreement between trustees and managers on:  
 
o an objective for the fund, benchmark(s) and risk parameters that together with all 
the other mandates are coherent with the fund’s aggregate objective and risk 
tolerances; 
 
o the manager’s approach in attempting to achieve the objective; and  
 
o clear timescale(s) of measurement and evaluation, such that the mandate will not 
be terminated before the expiry of the evaluation timescale other than for clear 
breach of the conditions of the mandate or because of significant change in the 
ownership or personnel of the investment manager. The mandate should not 
exclude the use of any set of financial instruments (e.g. private equity), without 
clear justification in the light of the specific circumstances of the fund. 
 
· Trustees should consider whether the index benchmarks they have selected are appropriate 
and should arrange for measurement of the performance of the fund.  
 
· A strengthened statement of investment principles, redesigned to improve transparency, 
should set out:  
 
o who is taking which decisions and why this structure has been selected;  
 
o the fund’s investment objective;  
 
o the fund’s planned asset allocation strategy, including projected investment returns 
on each asset class, and how the strategy has been arrived at;  
 
o the mandates given to all advisors and managers; and  
 
o the nature of the fee structures in place for all advisors and managers, and why this 
set of structures has been selected. 
 
· There should be annual reporting of results with clear explanations as to why a fund 
deviated from the SIP if it did so. 
 
Further details of the Myners’ Report are given in Appendix A, an illustrative statement of 
investment principles is presented in Appendix B, while an illustrative transparency statement is 
presented in Appendix C. 
 
Replacing the MFR requires primary legislation which is in the process of being drafted but is not 
expected to be implemented before 31 December 2004. In September 2001, the Department of 
Work and Pensions and H M Treasury (2001) announced some transitional measures, the most 
important of which were the extension to the deficit correction periods and the softening of the 
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MFR equity market value adjustment test. Seriously underfunded schemes were given up to three 
years rather than just one to bring themselves up to 90% MFR, and all schemes were given up to 
ten years rather than five to bring themselves up to 100% MFR. In addition, the dividend yield in 
the MFR equity MVA was reduced from 3.25% to 3%. Further, the requirement for annual 
recertification for schemes that are fully funded on an MFR test was removed. 
 
Trustees and fund managers will have to start thinking of ways of implementing these changes 
over the next few months.  In particular, they will have to pay considerable attention to: 
 
· the determination of the strategic asset allocation that is most appropriate for the pension 
scheme whose assets are being managed, 
 
· the setting of investment objectives, performance benchmarks and risk parameters that 
reflect the pension liabilities that will be delivered, and 
 
· the determination of the timescale over which the objective is to be achieved 
 
These factors are key inputs in asset- liability management strategies and in associated liability-
driven performance benchmarks and attribution.  We discuss these matters in the following 
sections. 
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3. Fund Management After Myners 
 
A funded pension scheme is composed of a pension fund plus a pension annuity.  A fund 
accumulates from contribution inflows and the investment returns (both income and capital 
gains) on the assets purchased with those contributions. The values of these assets are 
subject to market fluctuations and this is known as investment risk.  When a scheme member 
retires, he will receive a pension annuity that lasts for the remainder of his life. 
 
Most workers in the UK have defined benefit (DB) schemes in which the size of the pension 
benefit depends on factors such as final salary, length of pensionable service and age of member, 
rather than to the value of the assets in the fund. A typical UK scheme provides a pension equal to 
one-sixtieth (1.67%) of final salary for each year of pensionable service up to a maximum of 40 
years’ service; thus the maximum pension is two-thirds of final salary. This pension is promised 
whether or not there are sufficient assets in the fund to pay the pension. The actuarial value of this 
promise aggregated across all scheme members constitutes the liabilities of the pension scheme. 
Since DB schemes are mainly provided by employers, it is the sponsoring employer of a DB 
scheme who therefore bears the investment risk.  
 
If there are insufficient assets to pay the expected future pension in full, the pension scheme is 
said to be in actuarial deficit and the employer sponsoring the scheme is expected to restore the 
scheme to full funding by means of a series of deficiency payments over a specified period 
(currently 10 years), since the employer is expected to finance the pension scheme on a balance of 
cost basis. The actuarial deficit (where liabilities are measured as the actual cost of annuities for 
pensioner members and the cash equivalent transfer values on an MFR basis for active members) 
constitutes a debt on the employer for insolvency purposes and is equivalent to self- investment in 
the sponsoring employer’s company.  In extreme circumstances, where the sponsor cannot find 
the resources to make good the deficiency, the sponsor can close the fund or reduce wages in 
order to reduce its liabilities.  
 
If there are more than sufficient assets to pay the pension in full, the pension scheme is said to be 
in actuarial surplus and the employer generally extracts this surplus using employer contribution 
holidays, although the trustees of the scheme might come under pressure to enhance benefits as 
well. The fortunes of the fund manager appointed by the trustees to manage the scheme assets will 
be highly correlated with the extent to which deficits or surpluses are created.  
 
The appropriate investment management strategy for pension funds running DB schemes is asset-
liability management (ALM) (also called surplus risk management ): see, e.g., Fabozzi and 
Konishi (1991) or Blake (2003, Ch.13). 
 
 
The Surplus 
 
The surplus is defined as the difference between the market value of the assets and the actuarial 
value of the liabilities: 
 
  Surplus  =  Assets – Liabilities     (1) 
 
Liabilities are generally calculated using the projected unit method. The actuarial value of the 
pension liability for an active pension scheme member (assumed to be aged t) is usually 
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calculated by the scheme actuary using the projected unit method on the basis of Guidance Note 9 
(Retirement Benefits – Actuarial Reports) of the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries: 
 
  Liabilities  =  a(t) ´ W(t) ´ R(t,T) ´ P(t,T) ´ A(T) ´ D(t,T)  (2) 
 
where: 
 
· a(t) = Accrual factor for service by age t (e.g., 5/60th if the member has 5 years’ service 
and the 60th scale is used to determine the value of benefits). 
 
· W(t) = Pensionable salary at age t (e.g. £10,000). 
 
· R(t,T) = Revaluation factor for earnings between age t and retirement age T (=1 if there is 
no revaluation of earnings up until the retirement age, = (1 + g)(T-t)  if the revaluation rate 
g is constant). 
 
· P(t,T) = Retention factor = Probability of remaining in the scheme between age t and 
retirement age T: the two main reasons for a member not remaining in the scheme until 
retirement are death- in-service and leaving a scheme early as a result of changing jobs. 
 
· A(T) = Expected annuity factor (the present value of a life annuity of £1 per annum) at 
retirement age, T: A(T) = p(T,T+1)/(1+r) + p(T,T+2)/(1+r)2 + p(T,T+3)/(1+r)3 …, where 
terms such as p(T,T+1) are known as survival probabilities and indicate the probability of 
someone aged T surviving to age T+1 etc., and r is the real yield on the long-term bonds 
that are purchased by the insurance company and from which the pension payments are 
paid. 
 
· D(t,T) = Discount factor between age t and retirement age T (= 1/(1+r)(T-t) if the discount 
rate r is constant). 
 
To illustrate, suppose that we assume the following for a single male pension scheme member 
currently aged 35 and due to retire when he is 65: 
 
· a(t) = 5/60th 
 
· W(t) = £10,000 
 
· R(t,T) = 1.81 (assuming earnings growth of 2% p.a. in real terms over the next 30 years to 
retirement) 
 
· P(t,T) = 0.7 
 
· A(T) = 13.48 (assuming mortality experience based on the PMA92 mortality table and a 
real yield of 2.5% on long-term government bonds) 
 
· D(t,T) = 0.4767426 (assuming a real discount rate of 2.5% and 30 years to retirement). 
 
Then the actuarial value of the liabilities is £6,784 in respect of this member. 
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This is explained as follows. The member’s projected final salary is £18,100 (£10,000 ´ 1.81) in 
real terms, and the member is expecting a pension of 5/60th of his final salary or £1,508 (based on 
current service). This pension is payable for life. Based on the PMA92 mortality table, the pension 
fund will need to have accumulated £13.48 for each £1 of pension payable or £20,328 (£1,508 ´ 
13.48) by the time the member retires. The present value of this sum is £9,691. In other words, if 
we had £9,691 today and we invested it for 30 years at a real return of 2.5% p.a. (i.e., the same as 
the discount rate), we would have exactly the sum of money needed in 30 years’ time to purchase 
a life annuity for the member paying £1,508 p.a. in real terms for life. However, suppose that, 
based on the past experience of the pension scheme, there is only a 70% chance that the member 
will still be in service by his normal retirement age (i.e., there is a 30% chance that the member 
dies or leaves service between 35 and 65). If we multiply £9,691 by 70% we get £6,784. The 
pension scheme is fully funded if it has assets with a market value of £6,784 for this active 
member. 
 
Surplus Risk 
 
Surplus risk (also called mismatch risk or shortfall risk) is defined as the standard deviation of the 
surplus and is equal to: 
Surplus Risk = [ (Standard deviation of the Assets)2  
+ (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)2 
– 2 x 
{(Correlation between the Assets and Liabilities) 
x (Standard deviation of the Assets) 
x  (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)}]  (3) 
 
Standard deviation and correlation are explained in Appendix D.  
 
 
The Scheme-Specific Funding Standard 
 
With ALM the aim is to select the fund’s contribution rate and  strategic asset allocation (SAA) 
over time in a way that minimises a weighted sum of surplus risk (3) and contribution risk, 
subject to the constraints that the surplus (1) is zero on the retirement date of the scheme member 
and never falls outside a specified range before retirement (see, e.g. Haberman and Sung (1994)): 
 
 
Choose: Contribution Rate and Strategic Asset Allocation to: 
 
Minimise: Loss Function  = Surplus Risk + ´l Contribution Risk 
 
Subject to: 
 
Surplus = 0 on the retirement date 
 
Surplus ³  LB  and £  UB before retirement                                        (4) 
 
where LB is the lower bound below which the surplus may not go and UB is the upper bound. The 
weight l  shows the relative importance to the employer of minimising contribution risk in 
 14
comparison with minimising surplus risk: the higher the value of l , the greater the relative 
importance of contribution risk in determining the optimal strategic asset allocation. It is the 
trustees’ task to choose the value of l , taking into account the employer’s capacity to bear 
contribution risk. 
 
The ALM exercise (4) involves two objectives and two instruments for achieving those 
objectives. Broadly speaking, the contribution rate is set and adjusted to ensure that the surplus 
always lies within permitted boundaries and the SAA is set and adjusted to minimise the 
following loss function that is specific to a particular pension scheme: surplus risk + 
´l contribution risk. The SAA that minimises this loss function is the scheme-specific 
funding standard that replaces the MFR. 
 
 
Managing Surplus Risk 
 
To minimise surplus risk, the SAA is selected to match the pension liabilities in two key respects: 
size and volatility.  
 
;  Ensuring Full Funding 
 
First, if pension schemes are always fully funded, so that assets are always sufficient to meet 
liabilities in full (implying Assets = Liabilities at all times), then it is clear from (1) that the 
surplus will always be zero.  This is achieved by adjusting the contribution rate (especially the 
employer’s contribution rate) into the fund to ensure that (1) always holds.   
 
In practice, there are usually some tolerance limits around this equality.  In the UK, for example, 
it is permissible for the value of assets to vary between 90% and 105% of the value of liabilities 
before remedial action needs to be taken, implying that the surplus cannot exceed 5% of the value 
of the liabilities (UB = 0.05 x Liabilities) or fall below  –10% of the value of the liabilities (LB =  
–0.1 x Liabilities).   
 
If the value of assets exceeds the 105% limit, the scheme has up to 5 years to reduce the value to 
100% of liabilities (Social Security Act 1986).  The most common means of doing this is the 
employer’s contributions holiday, although other means are available: employee contributions 
holiday, improved pension benefits (i.e. raising Liabilities) or selling off financial assets (i.e. 
reducing Assets), the proceeds from which are returned to the sponsor subject to a 35% tax.   
 
If the value of assets falls below 90% of the value of liabilities, the scheme has up to 3 years to 
raise the value to 90% of liabilities and a further 7 years to raise the value to 100% of liabilities 
(Pensions Act 1995, as amended by the Occupational Pension Schemes (Minimum Funding 
Requirement and Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2001). The most common means of 
doing this is additional employer contributions (i.e. deficiency payments). 
 
 
;  Matching Volatility 
 
Second, if it were possible for the assets in the pension fund to be selected in such a way that their 
aggregate volatility matches that of the liabilities, then it is clear from (3) that surplus risk could 
be reduced to zero. This requires the assets in the pension fund to have both the same volatility as 
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the pension liabilities (Standard deviation of the Assets = Standard deviation of the Liabilities) 
and to be perfectly correlated with them  (Correlation between the Assets and Liabilities = 1). In 
this case: 
 
          Surplus Risk = [ (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)2  
                              + (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)2   
                                        - 2 x {(1)  x (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)  
                   x (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)}] 
                       = [ 2 x (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)2  
                                         - 2 x (Standard deviation of the Liabilities)2 ] 
                                 = 0                                                                                   (5) 
 
When surplus risk is zero, the value of the assets and liabilities will always go up and down 
exactly in line with each other.   
 
;  The Volatility of the Liabilities 
 
In reality, however, assets do not exist with these precise characteristics. With existing assets, 
surplus risk can be reduced but not completely eliminated: the assets and liabilities will go up 
together and down together but not exactly in line. We can see why this is the case by examining 
the standard deviation of the liabilities in (2): 
 
         Standard deviation of the liabilities » a(t) x W(t) x 
       [{ ´´´ DAP  Standard deviation of the revaluation factor R(t,T)}2  
                + { ´´´ DAR  Standard deviation of the retention factor P(t,T)} 2   
                + { ´´´ DPR  Standard deviation of the annuity factor A(T)} 2  
                + { ´´´ APR  Standard deviation of the discount factor D(t,T)} 2]         (6) 
                                                                                  
 
The definition (6) assumes that the factors determining the volatility of R(t,T), P(t,T), A(T), and 
D(t,T) are all independent of each other; mean values of variables are represented by bars over the 
variables. In (6), a(t) and W(t) are known at the time the calculation is made, so any volatility in 
the liabilities arises from volatility in the revaluation, retention, annuity and discount factors.  
 
The Volatility of the Revaluation Factor 
The standard deviation of the revaluation factor R(t,T) depends on the volatility of the member’s 
earnings between now and retirement. No financial asset presently exists to match this volatility 
perfectly. This is because no government or corporation has so far issued wage- indexed bonds, 
that is, bonds whose coupon and principal value are linked to national average earnings. Such 
bonds would provide a perfect matching asset for liabilities linked to average earnings growth, 
although they would provide a less than perfect match if the member’s earnings did not grow 
exactly in line with national average earnings. The nearest financial instrument available for 
matching liabilities linked to earnings growth is a price-indexed bond (usually known as an index-
linked bond). This is because it is known that price inflation and wage inflation are highly 
correlated (Thornton and Wilson (1992)). 
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But even if a pension fund held only index- linked bonds in its portfolio, it would still be exposed 
to productivity shocks.  This follows from the relationship that determines wage inflation: 
 
Wage inflation = b1 x Price inflation  + b2 x Productivity growth       (7) 
 
On average we would expect both price inflation and productivity improvements to be 
incorporated fully into earnings growth (i.e., we would expect b1 = b2 = 1), although in slump 
conditions we might observe b1 , b2 < 1, while in boom conditions we might observe  b1 , b2 > 1.  
Suppose, we set b1 = b2 = 1, then it will be the case that (assuming price inflation and productivity 
growth are independent of each other and therefore uncorrelated): 
 
           Standard deviation of wage inflation =  
Standard deviation of price inflation  
+ Standard deviation of productivity growth          (8) 
 
This indicates that an index- linked bond will perfectly match the pension scheme’s exposure to 
price inflation, but leave it exposed to productivity shocks (i.e., the standard deviation of 
productivity growth). An unanticipated increase in the productivity of the workforce (say as result 
of a technological innovation) will raise their wages and hence the liabilities of the pension 
scheme, but this will not be matched by an increase in the value of the assets held in the fund.   
 
The Volatility of the Retention Factor 
The standard deviation of the retention factor P(t,T) depends on the volatility of both staff 
turnover and death- in-service rates between now and retirement.  
 
The Volatility of the Annuity Factor 
The standard deviation of the annuity factor A(T) depends in a highly complex manner on a 
combination of mortality risk, inflation risk and interest rate risk. 
 
Mortality Risk 
Mortality risk is the uncertainty attached to the survival probabilities, p(T,T+1), p(T,T+2), etc.  
There has been an enormous improvement in mortality over the last 20 years which pension 
providers (such as insurance companies and pension schemes) have seriously underestimated. If 
pension providers underestimate the improvement in mortality, then the cost of providing a 
pension will be higher than was anticipated at the time that the member joined the scheme which 
might have been 40 years or more before the pension begins to be drawn.  
 
Inflation Risk 
When the pension becomes payable it should be matched with an instrument whose payouts 
replicate as closely as possible the underlying pension payments. Most pensions are subject to 
limited price indexation or LPI (i.e., retail price inflation up to a maximum of 5% p.a.), so the 
nearest available matching asset for this liability is an index- linked bond. In other words, the 
inflation risk associated with paying LPI pensions is minimised by holding index- linked bonds.  
(The perfect matching asset, the asset that reduces the inflation risk that faces the pension payer to 
zero, is an LPI bond.) 
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Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is the uncertainty attached to the yield curve. If there is an unanticipated fall in 
yields, then the cost of buying index- linked bonds rises. This is precisely what happened in the 
case of the guaranteed annuities offered by Equitable Life. Equitable Life sold deferred annuities 
with guaranteed high yields between 1957 and 1988, but it failed to hedge its exposure to interest 
rate risk.  If interest rates fell, this would increase the cost of buying the bonds that are used to 
make the annuity payments. By the late 1990s, when the annuities started to get paid, interest rates 
had fallen to their lowest level for 40 years and Equitable Life found itself with insufficient 
reserves to pay the now very high cost of buying the requisite bonds. 
 
;  The Choice of Discount Rate 
 
The choice of discount factor D(t,T) in (2) (and in consequence its standard deviation in (6)) has 
been the subject of increasing disagreement in recent years. The nature of the disagreement can be 
expressed simply as follows. Should the discount rate reflect the liabilities to be paid, or should it 
reflect the pension fund’s asset allocation?  In other words, should the discount rate reflect the 
growth rate in liabilities, or should it reflect the weighted-average expected return on the assets in 
the pension fund?  
 
If the discount rate is set to equal the growth rate g in liabilities, then it is clear from (2) that:  
 
    D(t,T)  =  1/(1 + g)(T-t)  = 1/R(t,T)         (9) 
 
in which case the value of liabilities in (2) reduces to: 
 
Liabilities  = a(t) x W(t) x R(t,T) x P(t,T) x A(T) x (1/R(t,T)) 
 
= a(t) x W(t) x P(t,T) x A(T)     (10) 
 
and the standard deviation of the liabilities in (6) reduces to: 
 
 Standard deviation of the liabilities » a(t) ´ W(t) ´ 
            [{ ´A  Standard deviation of the retention factor P(t,T)} 2   
                + { ´P  Standard deviation of the annuity factor A(T)} 2 ]               (11) 
 
So the only source of volatility that a pension fund need be concerned about is the volatility of the 
retention and annuity factors. However, as we indicated above, this is only a strictly legitimate 
procedure if the pension fund is fully invested in wage- indexed bonds. Some argue that pension 
liabilities should still be discounted in this manner even though such bonds do not exist. 
 
Others argue that the discount factor should reflect the reality of the asset allocation that is 
actually adopted by the pension fund, in which case r should equal the weighted-average expected 
return on the N assets in the pension fund: 
 
NN mmmr ´++´+´= qqq ...2211             (12) 
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where  
 
· 1q = weight in the pension fund of asset 1 (e.g., 50% in UK equities), etc 
 
· 1m = expected real return on asset 1 (e.g., 4% for UK equities), etc. 
 
If there is a significant equity component in the asset allocation of the pension fund, then the 
standard deviation of the discount rate could be quite high (since the volatility of equities is much 
higher than that of other assets) and could come to dominate the standard deviation of the 
liabilities itself.   
 
Managing Contribution Risk 
 
Contribution risk deals with the volatility of contributions into the scheme.  If surplus risk is 
minimised, contributions into the scheme will be higher but more stable over time than if surplus 
risk is not minimised. Now employers usually like to have lower contributions than higher 
contributions. 
 
But there is no free lunch. The only way to have lower average contributions is to invest more of 
the fund in equities and to accept greater surplus risk (i.e., a large fall in the value of the equities 
held in the pension fund that is not matched by a corresponding fall in the value of the liabilities) 
as a consequence. This, in turn, means that there will be greater contribution risk, i.e., 
contributions will be more volatile than if surplus risk is minimised. When the equity market is 
booming, there is likely to be an employer contribution holiday, but when the equity market 
slumps, there will be a scheme deficit that needs to be covered according to the MFR rules up to 
31 December 2004 and the replacement rules thereafter. Furthermore, this call on the employer 
happens at a time when the employer’s own share price is also likely to have fallen, a double 
whammy to the employer. The employer has to go to the market in an attempt to raise funds to put 
into his pension fund. If successful, the employer’s gearing level might rise to dangerously high 
levels. If unsuccessful, the company itself could become insolvent. 
 
So the trustees face a complex trade-off between surplus risk, contribution risk, and the expected 
level of contributions into the fund.  A heavy investment in low volatility assets, such as cash, 
index-linked bonds and property, will lower surplus risk and contribution risk, but raise average 
contributions.  A heavy investment in equities will raise surplus risk and contribution risk, but 
lower average contributions. It is this trade -off that turns the selection of the asset allocation 
of the pension fund from a purely technical exercise into one that must take account of the 
attitude of the employer, as the voluntary sponsor of the pension scheme, to both surplus 
risk and contribution risk.  
 
The optimal strategic asset allocation for a pension fund is given in Appendix E. 
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4. The Roles of the Investment Advisor, Actuary and  
Fund Manager after Myners 
 
The introduction of a scheme-specific funding standard will radically change the relationship 
between the investment advisor, actuary and fund manager.  
 
Under existing arrangements, pension schemes do not tend to have an independent investment 
advisor. The investment advisory function is carried out either by the scheme actuary (or 
consultant actuary) or, more commonly, by the fund manager. However, the absence of an 
independent investment advisor can lead to inconsistencies.  
 
The task of valuing the liabilities and setting of the contribution rate is usually undertaken by the 
scheme actuary. A typical fund manager will generally not undertake his own actuarial valuation, 
but instead accept the valuation for the liabilities and the contribution rate determined by the 
scheme actuary as given. The fund manager’s task is to recommend an asset allocation to the 
trustees, based on his assessment of the trustees’ attitudes to surplus and contribution risk.  
 
However, there is the potential for the decisions of the actuary to be inconsistent with those of the 
fund manager.  The actuary typically chooses a contribution rate based on a notional asset 
allocation that he has selected without any reference to the attitude to risk of the trustees.  The 
fund manager takes the contribution rate as given but then chooses an asset allocation that does 
reflect the attitude to risk of the trustees.  
 
An inconsistency arises whenever the asset allocation chosen by the fund manager differs from 
the notional asset allocation chosen by the actuary.  Suppose that the fund manager chooses a 
more defensive asset allocation than implied by the notional asset allocation. Surplus and 
contribution risk will be lower than for the notional portfolio, but the required contribution rate 
will be higher than the actual contribution rate into the fund, since the more defensive strategy is 
likely to generate a lower average return than assumed by the actuary. Eventually a deficit will 
emerge and this will have to be covered by higher contributions. The fund manager bears the risk 
of disappointing the trustees and sponsor over his performance, unless he has carefully explained 
the potential inconsistency and extracted higher contributions from the start.  
 
The Myners Report recognises this potential inconsistency and recommends that schemes appoint 
an investment advisor, independent of both the actuary and fund manager. This could result in a 
hierarchical relationship between the investment advisor, actuary and fund manager. The 
investment advisor will determine the long-term strategic asset allocation, based on the 
employer’s attitude to surplus and contribution risks. The actuary will take this strategic asset 
allocation and determine the required contribution rate, based on his calculation of pension 
scheme liabilities, since only actuaries are qualified to calculate a pension scheme’s liabilities in 
(2) above. 
 
The fund manager will be reduced to the subsidiary role of managing the surplus, i.e., making 
stock selection decisions and market timing or tactical asset allocation decisions relative to a long-
term strategic asset allocation benchmark. Stock selection decisions deal with which particular 
securities to hold within a given asset class, e.g., whether to hold BT or C&W within the equity 
class.  Market timing or tactical asset allocation decisions involve short-run adjustments to the 
long-run SAA by temporarily reducing the weight in one asset class and increasing it in another, 
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e.g., raising the weight in cash relative to equities because it is believed that the equity market is 
temporarily overvalued. 
 
The loss function minimisation exercise (4) above determined both the SAA and the way in which 
the SAA changes over time as the fund matures. The SAA is therefore an essentially passive 
component of the investment management process, depending largely on the maturity structure of 
the liabilities. The key objective with the SAA is to implement and manage it passively at the 
lowest possible cost. The active components of the investment management process are the stock 
selection and market timing decisions. Fund managers use their research and skills to identify 
undervalued and overvalued securities (stock selection) and undervalued and overvalued sectors 
(market timing) and attempt to add value by constructing investment portfolios that are relatively 
overweight in what the fund managers believe are undervalued securities and sectors and are 
relatively overweight in what they believe to be overvalued securities and sectors. If they are 
correct in their beliefs, they will generate a higher return than if they merely picked the portfolio 
that reflected the current  market consensus (known as the market portfolio). Furthermore, they 
will attempt to add value in this way without taking on excessive additional surplus risk. If, on the 
other hand, they are incorrect in their beliefs, they will lose value for the fund and may well do so 
in a way that increases the fund’s surplus risk exposure. 
 
Another issue concerns the length of investment management contracts. It seems natural that these 
should be related to the actuarial valuation cycle which is typically three years. So contract terms 
that are multiples of three years are likely to develop. 
 
Another potential problem concerns the interpretation of measures of investment performance in 
the light of the technique.  Asset-liability management justifies different pension funds pursuing 
different investment strategies.  For example, small, fast-growing funds might pursue very 
aggressive investment strategies, while large mature funds might adopt passive investment 
strategies.  As a result, single performance league tables drawn up on the assumption that all funds 
are pursuing the same objective of maximising returns are increasingly uninformative.  This is 
discussed in the next section. 
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5. Performance Measurement after Myners 
 
In the light of the Myners Report, pension funds are likely to change their fund management 
strategy to one based on asset-liability management. A natural consequence of this is that 
performance benchmarks and performance attribution will also change to reflect the new 
emphasis on liabilities. 
 
Liability-Driven Performance Benchmarks 
 
For at least 20 years pension fund performance measurement in the UK has been dominated by 
peer-group benchmarks. More recently customised benchmarks that reflect the particular 
circumstances of the pension fund have become more common: by 2000 more than half of all UK 
pension funds had customised benchmarks.  Following the Myners Report, the use of liability-
driven performance benchmarks are likely to become much more prominent. 
 
From the analysis above, we know that the liabilities of a final salary pension scheme depend on 
expected earnings growth; they also depend on forecasts of life expectancy and the discount rate 
used for discounting liabilities.  
 
One natural benchmark would therefore be earnings growth or price inflation. A related 
benchmark might be GDP growth. Earnings growth and GDP growth are related in the long run, 
since the share of wages in national income does not trend significantly over time: in fact in long-
run dynamic equilibrium, earnings growth and GDP growth will be the same. However, over the 
course of any business cycle, the growth rates in these two variables can differ substantially.  
 
Another natural benchmark for pension funds would be the growth rate in consumption 
expenditure, since a pension scheme’s primary purpose is to finance consumption expenditure in 
retirement. Strictly speaking the weights for the consumption expenditure index should reflect the 
pattern of expenditure by the elderly, which might have a higher weight in medical expenses and a 
lower weight in foreign holidays, say, than younger more active cohorts of the population. Again 
in long-run dynamic equilibrium, the growth rates in GDP and consumption expenditure will be 
the same (otherwise the savings ratio will tend towards either zero or unity).  
 
The discount rate for discounting future liabilities provides another possible benchmark if it is set 
independently of the return on the assets in the fund. Some asset- liability models use the return on 
the assets in the fund as the discount rate for liabilities: obviously this could not be used as a 
benchmark. Others use the yield on long-term government or corporate bonds.  
 
The justification for using a bond yield is that pension fund liabilities are less risky than equities 
and hence should be discounted at a lower yield. On the other hand, pension fund liabilities are 
not risk free, and so the discount rate should be higher than that on Treasury bills. This suggests 
that a bond yield provides an appropriate discount rate.  The Faculty and Institute of Actuaries 
requires that a government bond yield is used to calculate (the first twelve years of) pension 
liabilities under the MFR. However, in November 2000, the Accounting Standards Board 
recommended using an AA corporate bond yield in Financial Reporting Standard 17 (FRS17). 
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Liability-Driven Performance Attribution 
 
Liability-driven performance attribution (LDPA) is the name given to the framework for 
identifying the sources of investment performance in the case of asset- liability managed portfolios 
(see, e.g., Blake (1998b)). It is one way of analysing the active-passive split. 
 
We can illustrate the LDPA framework using the following balance sheet for an asset- liability 
managed pension fund: 
 
Assets 
 
 Liabilities  
Liability-driven assets 
 
B Pension liabilities L 
General assets E Surplus  S 
 
Suppose that the pension liabilities (L) constitute a predictable set of future cash outflows linked 
to inflation.  The fund manager can meet these cash outflows by investing in index- linked bonds 
(B) with the same pattern of cash flows; these bonds constitute the liability-driven assets (LDAs) 
in the balance sheet above. Suppose that the pension fund  surplus (S) is invested in general assets 
(E).  These can be any assets matching the risk-return preferences expressed by the pension 
scheme’s sponsor (e.g. equities).  The surplus is defined as assets (B+E) minus liabilities (L). The 
return on the surplus is defined as: 
 
LrBrErSr LBES -+=                  (13) 
 
where 
 
Sr  = rate of return on the surplus 
Er  = rate of return on the general assets 
Br  = rate of return on the liability-driven assets 
 Lr   = payout rate on the liabilities. 
 
Both the pension liabilities and the liability-driven assets are sensitive to changes in interest rates.  
Higher interest rates reduce the present value of pension liabilities.  Similarly, higher interest rates 
reduce the value of the index- linked bonds, since a given stream of coupon payments fixed in real 
terms is worth less today when yields on alternative assets are higher. 
 
Assuming that interest rate risk is the only source of risk to this portfolio, we can use equation 
(13) to derive a decomposition of portfolio performance as follows.  First, we rewrite the return on 
the general assets as: 
 
)( SErSrEr EEE -+=                (14) 
 
and the return on the liability-driven assets as: 
 
)( LBrLrBr BBB -+=                (15) 
 
Then we can divide each side of (13) by S and substitute (14) and (15) to get the LDPA: 
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or: 
 
Rate of return on the surplus     =    Rate of return on the general assets  
                                                                       + Rate of return on the LDAs due to 
                                                                          security selection 
                                                                       + Rate of return on the LDAs due to market timing 
                                                                       + Rate of return from a funding mismatch 
 
where: 
 
==
S
La  financial leverage ratio 
 
=-=-=
S
SE
S
BLb funding mismatch ratio 
 
=Br expected return on bonds when they are correctly priced on the basis of the spot yield 
curve (i.e. when the future coupon payments are discounted using the appropriate spot 
yields) - see, e.g., Blake (2000, chapter 5). 
 
The four-component LDPA in (16) can be explained as follows: 
 
· The rate of return on general assets ( Er ).  This can be analysed using standard techniques, 
e.g., comparing performance against a pre-agreed peer group or external benchmark. 
 
· The rate of return on the liability-driven assets due to stock selection in terms of say credit 
quality management or sector management.  This follows because Br  is the actual return 
generated by the bonds chosen by the fund manager, whereas Br  is the benchmark return 
on the bonds if they were correctly priced according to the spot yield curve: )( BB rr -  is 
therefore the excess return arising from the stock selection skills of the fund manager. 
 
· The rate of return on the liability-driven assets due to market timing, that is, from 
choosing a portfolio of bonds with a maturity structure that differs from  that  of  the  
underlying  liabilities,  thereby  deliberately  leaving  the portfolio partially exposed to 
interest rate risk. 
 
· The rate of return from a funding mismatch, that is, from active management of the 
liability-driven assets such that part of this category is invested in riskier general assets 
such as equities. 
 
In the case where the surplus is exactly zero, the decomposition in (16) is not defined.  The fund 
manager has just generated a sufficient return to meet the payout rate on liabilities.  The LDPA in 
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this case would be based on  )/()/( LBrLErr BEL += where (E/L) is the portfolio weight in general 
assets and (B/L) is the portfolio weight in liability-driven assets (see (13)). 
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6. Illustration 
 
Asset-Liability Management 
 
We can illustrate how the optimal asset allocation (see (E.1) in Appendix E) might be determined 
using data on the returns on key asset classes over the period 1947-2000.  Table 1 shows that 
equities had the highest real returns over the period and cash (represented by UK Treasury bills) 
the least.  In between came property and bonds.  Equities, especially UK equities, were also the 
most volatile assets, as measured by standard deviation (explained in Appendix D). 
Unsurprisingly, cash had the lowest volatility, but property, while having a higher average return 
than bonds, had a lower volatility.  Property returns also had the highest correlation with the 
growth rate in liabilities (measured by real earnings growth) at 36% (explained in Appendix D). 
The next highest was cash at 21%.  All the other asset classes had negative correlations with the 
liabilities, ranging from –2% for international fixed-income bonds to a massive –34% for UK 
fixed income bonds. UK index- linked bonds were also negatively correlated with earnings growth 
over the 20-year period of their existence, but this was compensated for by a low standard 
deviation and average returns almost as high as property. On the basis of the historical data given 
in Table 12, we should not be surprised to find that property, cash, and index- linked and 
international fixed- income bonds would have played a significant role in portfolios that minimised 
the loss function in equation (4). 
 
 
 
Table 1: Historical Performance of Asset Classes, 1947-2000 
Asset Class  Mean  
Real Return + 
Standard 
Deviation* 
Correlation with 
Liabilities* 
UK Equities 10% 27% -5% 
International Equities 9% 21% -5% 
UK Index-Linked Bonds$ 4% 7% -7% 
UK Fixed-Income Bonds 2% 14% -34% 
International Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
2% 17% -2% 
Property+ 5% 10% 36% 
Cash 1% 2% 21% 
UK Earnings 2% 2% 100% 
The returns on international equities and bonds are equal to the returns on US equities and bonds over the 
period. + Return in  excess of inflation * See Appendix D $ The statistics for UK index-linked bonds are for 
the period 1982-2000   + Commercial and industrial  
Sources: CSFB Equity-Gilt Study, Datastream, Financial Statistics , Investment Property Databank, Economic 
Trends Annual Supplement, Annual Abstract of Statistics , British Labour Statistics Historical Abstract 1886-
1968, British Economy Key Statistics 1900-1970, Global Financial Data.  
 
The post-war period was an exceptional one for equity performance, generating the highest 
sustained real returns in recorded history. It is unlikely that such high real returns will be repeated 
in future. In the illustration below, we assume that asset classes have the same volatilities and 
                                                 
2 The correlations with liabilities in Table 1 differ markedly from those presented in a recent study by 
PricewaterhouseCooopers (2001). For example, the latter reports a correlation for index-linked bonds of 100% against 
–7% in Table 1. The reason for the difference is that the PricewaterhouseCooopers study bases the total return on the 
index-linked bond on the book value which is uprated annually in line with inflation, whereas in Table 1 the market 
value of the bond is used.  So Table 1 is consistent with the marking to market of the asset portfolio, while the 
PricewaterhouseCooopers study is not.  
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correlation structures with liabilities as over the period 1947-20003. However, we make the 
following assumptions about mean returns. The mean real return on equities is assumed to be 4%, 
the equity risk premium is assumed to be 1.5% so that the real returns on all other assets is 
assumed to be 2.5%. Except for cash which is assumed to have a real return of 1%, the same as 
the historical average. Table 2 shows the performance data that we use in the illustration. 
 
The second column of Table 3 shows the pension fund average strategic asset allocation for 2000 
(denoted PFA2000 in the table).  The portfolio was heavily invested in UK and international 
equities, with a combined weight in excess of 70%.  The next largest asset category was UK 
fixed- income bonds with a weighting of 13%.  Low weights (around 3% each) were attached to 
cash, property and international bonds.  The value of the loss function (4) (as a proportion of 
liabilities) was 0.6615.  The remaining columns of Table 3 present evidence demonstrating that 
the PFA2000 strategic asset allocation was not the minimum loss portfolio based on the 
performance parameters assumed in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Assumed Performance of Asset Classes  
Asset Class  Mean  
Real Return + 
Standard 
Deviation* 
Correlation with 
Liabilities* 
UK Equities 4% 27% -5% 
International Equities 4% 21% -5% 
UK Index-Linked Bonds 2.5% 7% -7% 
UK Fixed-Income Bonds 2.5% 14% -34% 
International Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
2.5% 17% -2% 
Property 2.5% 10% 36% 
Cash 1% 2% 21% 
UK Earnings 2% 2% 100% 
Source: Table 1  + Return in  excess of inflation * See Appendix D 
 
 
The third column presents the minimum loss portfolio in the case of l = 0 (the case for which the 
trustees and employer are not concerned about contribution risk at all) for the 35-year old male 
pension scheme member discussed above.  The liabilities in respect of this member equalled 
£6,784.  We assume that the pension scheme is fully funded in respect of this member and plans 
to remain so. This, in return, requires an aggregate contribution rate of 20% of the member’s 
pensionable earnings, which we assume is divided 6% from the employee and 14% from the 
employer. The minimum loss portfolio in this case is heavily weighted in cash (53%), UK index-
linked bonds (24%) and property (15%). Very little (just 7.5%) is invested in UK equities, the 
principal current asset class of UK pension funds.  Nothing at all is invested in either UK fixed-
income bonds or international equities.  There is a small weight (0.5%) in international fixed-
income bonds.  The loss function for this portfolio is 0.6245. 
 
                                                 
3 It is important to recognise that although finance theory tells us the parameters, such as volatilities and correlations, 
that are needed to determine the optimal asset allocation (see (E.1)), it provides no guidance on how these should be 
estimated.  In this analysis, we have based our estimates on annual returns over the last 50 years. Very different 
results might emerge if a different basis is used, e.g., three-year average returns over the last 20 years. Averages over 
periods longer than three years could be used, although this would be harder to justify given the three-year actuarial 
evaluation cycle. 
 
 27
 
Table 3: Strategic Asset Allocations  
Asset Class  PFA 
2000 
Minimum Loss Portfolio as a Function of l  
  0 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.1 1.0 
Cash 3.0 53.0 41.8 35.6 26.8 20.6 13.3 12.4 
UK Equities 48.0 7.5 9.0 9.9 10.9 11.1 11.3 11.3 
UK Property 2.8 15.0 30.6 39.4 51.2 55.8 61.1 61.8 
UK Indexed-Linked 
Bonds 
7.7 24.0 13.5 7.6 0 0 0 0 
UK Fixed- Income 
Bonds 
13.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Int. Equities 22.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Int. Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
3.1 0.5 5.1 7.5 11.1 12.5 14.3 14.5 
Loss Function 0.6615 0.6245 0.6126 0.6104 0.6076 0.6069 0.6063 0.6066 
Source: PALMOD. PFA2000 means the CAPS pension fund average portfolio for 2000 
 
 
As l  increases (implying increasing concern about contribution risk), we observe the following 
changes to the minimum loss portfolio: the weights in cash and UK index- linked bonds falls (for 
values of l equal to 0.005 or above, the weighting is zero), the weights in property and 
international bonds rise sharply, while there is a less steep increase in UK equity holdings. The 
overall minimum loss portfolio occurs when l  takes the value of 0.1 and the loss function takes a 
value of 0.6063. There are just four asset classes in this portfolio: property (61.1%), international 
fixed income bonds (14.3%), cash (13.3%), and UK equities (11.3%).  The first three asset classes 
can be explained by their (relatively) high correlations with liabilities, while the last category is 
explained by its high real return. Most asset- liability models tend to produce a high weight in 
property, but this result is ‘often suppressed by the programmer’ (PricewaterhouseCoopers (2001, 
p4)).  
 
The table shows that the minimum loss portfolio is very sensitive to values of l  in the range 0 to 
0.1, but not sensitive to values of l above 0.1.  The last column of the table shows that the 
minimum loss portfolio when l  = 1 is virtually identical to that when l  = 0.1. The same is true 
for values of l  above 1.  
 
Table 4 compares some properties of the distributions of the asset- liability ratio derived from a 
Monte Carlo simulation of two of the strategic asset allocations given in Table 3 using the asset 
return and volatility assumptions given in Table 2.  The two SAAs are the PFA2000 and the 
global minimum loss portfolio (GMLP) (that for l  = 0.1).  The distribution is derived from 5000 
simulations of three-year ahead pension fund asset values over three-year ahead liability values 
beginning from an initial asset- liability of unity (i.e., full funding or zero surplus) and a planned 
contribution rate of 20% of pensionable earnings.  The three-year horizon corresponds with the 
typical interval between actuarial valuations in the UK. 
 
The mean asset- liability ratio is near unity for both asset allocations, reflecting the fact that the 
contribution rate of 20% was set to maintain full funding over the three-year horizon.    
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The greater risk of the PFA2000 compared with the GMLP is evident from examining the extreme 
left-tail of the distribution. The 1% value-at-risk is 0.62 in the case of the PFA2000 and 0.68 in 
the case of the GMLP. This means that there is a 1% probability of the asset-liability ratio being 
less than 0.62 in the case of the PFA2000 and a 1% probability of the asset-liability ratio being 
less than 0.68 in the case of the GMLP (see Appendix D). Chart 1 illustrates this graphically. To 
raise the 1% VaR of the PFA2000 to equal that of the GMLP would require the contribution rate 
with the PFA2000 to rise by 9.7% (i.e., 0.68/0.62 – 1) from 20% to 21.9%.  The VaRs are equal at 
the 20% level at 0.87.  Above the 20% level, the PFA2000 VaR exceeds the GMLP VaR. The 
median VAR is 1.05 with the PFA2000 and 1.03 with the GMLP, reflecting the higher expected 
return of the PFA2000 compared with the GMLP. 
 
This illustration shows the trade-offs involved in setting a scheme-specific funding standard. The 
strategic asset allocation that minimises the loss function in (4), namely the GMLP, would he lp to 
reduce extreme negative outcomes, namely very low asset-liability ratios.  Other strategic asset 
allocations with higher equity weighting and hence volatility, such as that currently typical of  UK 
pension funds, namely the PFA2000, would require higher contributions than the GMLP in order 
to lower the probability of these extreme negative outcomes arising. However, the strategic asset 
allocations that have higher equity weightings, while having higher volatility, also have higher 
expected returns and hence generate higher median asset-liability ratios.  The GMLP would need 
2% (ie, 1.05/1.03 – 1) higher contributions than the PFA2000 in order to match the latter in terms 
of median asset-liability ratios4. 
 
 
                                                 
4 It should be emphasised again that the strategic asset allocations reported in Table 3 are purely illustrative. They do 
not necessarily indicate how SAAs might look in the future, since the assumed performance parameters in Table 2 are 
based largely on a period of high inflation, lower international capital mobility and no euro.  Nor are they intended to 
be critical of SAAs pre-Myners when pension funds were pursuing rather different objectives. 
 
 
Table 4: Mean Three-Year Ahead Asset-Liability Ratios and 
Values-at-Risk with Two Strategic Asset Allocations  
Statistic PFA2000* Global Minimum Loss Portfolio 
)1.0( =l  
Mean  0.99 1.00 
1% VaR 0.62 0.68 
5% VaR 0.73 0.76 
20% VaR 0.87 0.87 
50% VaR 1.05 1.03 
Source: PALMOD * UK pension fund average for 2000 
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Chart 1: 1% VaR with the PFA2000 and GMLP Strategic Asset Allocations 
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Liability-Driven Performance Attribution 
 
The LDPA can be illustrated using the following example.  Suppose that a pension fund has the 
following balance sheet at the start and end of the year: 
 
Assets    Liabilities   
 Start year End year  Start year End year 
Liability-driven assets (B) 
 
6500 6689 Pension liabilities (L) 6784 6967 
General assets (E) 
 
600 634 Surplus (S) 316 356 
Total 7100 7323  7100 7323 
 
We will assume that the liability-driven assets are bonds, while the general assets are equities (and 
that equities have no yield curve effect).   
 
We have the following returns on the components of the balance sheet: 
 
Component Realised rate  of return  
 (%, real)  
Benchmark rate of return 
 (%, real) 
Bonds 
Br  = 2.90 Br  = 2.50 (assumption)
Equities 
Er  = 5.67 Er  = 6.00 (assumption)
Liabilities 
Lr  = 2.70  
 
The realised rates of return are found by taking the difference between the end-of-year and start-
of-year values as a ratio of the start-of-year values.  The benchmark return on bonds is calculated 
in a similar way but based on start- and end-year present values of coupon payments using 
appropriate spot yields.  The benchmark return on equities is simply the realised return on a 
relevant index, e.g. the FT-A All Share Index. 
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Using equation (16) with a  = L/S = 21.47 and b  = (L-B)/S = 0.899 (using start-of-year values), 
the LDPA is determined as follows: 
 
Component Return (%, real) 
General assets ( Er ) 5.67 
Security selection ( )( BB rr -a ) +8.59 
Market timing ( )( LB rr -a ) - 4.29 
Funding mismatch ( )( BE rr -b ) + 2.49 
Total 12.46% 
 
The total real rate of return on the surplus of 12.46% is made up of 5.67% from the performance 
of the general assets, 8.59% from successful stock selection of the bond portfolio, 2.49% from a 
successful funding mismatch, and a loss of 4.29% from market timing.  The security selection and 
market timing effects are magnified by a high leverage ratio (a ) of 21.47 (the minimum 
permissible is 20 since the surplus may not (in the long term) exceed 5% of liabilities), while the 
funding mismatch effect is magnified by a smaller funding mismatch ratio (b ) of 0.899.  The 
positive net return of 4.3% from active fund management (i.e., the sum of the returns from 
security selection and market timing) and the positive net return from a funding mismatch help to 
generate a high surplus return.  However, this cannot conceal the fact that the fund manager 
underperformed the benchmark in terms of general assets by 0.33%. 
 
LDPA therefore tells us a great deal about the investment skills of the pension fund manager when 
he or she is constrained on the liability side of  the balance sheet. The only additional information 
that is required over the current performance measurement framework is as follows: the present 
value of the pension liabilities (as determined by the pension scheme’s actuary), together with the 
payout rate on these, and the value of liability-driven assets, together with a customised 
benchmark return on these.   
 
LDPA is likely to become considerably more prominent following the introduction of scheme-
specific funding standards. In this new world, peer-group benchmarks will become far less 
significant and their use is likely to be confined to the ‘general asset’ category of pension fund 
portfolios. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The Myners Report signalled the end of the Minimum Funding Requirement. This will have a 
number of significant consequences for pension fund management and performance measurement 
in the UK. 
 
The strategic asset allocation will have overriding importance in pension fund management. Asset 
classes are likely to be selected on the basis of their match with liabilities in terms of volatility and 
correlation, rather than on the basis of expected return. Every pension scheme will have a scheme-
specific funding standard that reflects the maturity structure of the liabilities of the scheme. 
 
Asset-liability management involves the minimisation of both surplus risk and contribution risk 
and the optimal asset allocation depends on the attitude of the employer to each type of risk. It is 
hard to predict how correlation patterns between asset returns and liabilities will develop in the 
future. However, if fund managers believe that correlation patterns in the future will be similar to 
those in the past, then the optimal asset allocation has a high weight in property, cash, index-
linked bonds and international fixed- income bonds and a corresponding low weight in equity, 
including private equity, and domestic fixed- income bonds.  
 
It is important to take into account both the feasibility of a major switch in strategic asset 
allocations and the transitional consequences.  Are there sufficient investment property and index-
linked bonds available for pension funds to switch into? What would happen to equity prices if all 
pension funds tried to sell their holdings at the same time? Table 5 indicates that UK pension 
funds with total asset holdings of around £800bn would collectively find it difficult to make the 
switches in asset allocations (particularly into property and index- linked bonds) indicated above 
and high short-term volatility in asset prices could be expected as a result.  Certainly higher 
returns on assets in high demand would attract additional supplies, but this could take time. 
 
 
Table 5: Market Capitalisation of Key UK Asset Classes at 31 
December 2001 
Asset Class   Market Capitalisation (£bn)   
UK Money Market Securities  541 
UK Fixed-Income Government Bonds  204 
UK Index-Linked Government Bonds  71 
UK Fixed-Income Non-Government 
Bonds* 
 225 
UK Index-Linked Non-Government 
Bonds* 
 5 
UK Equity  1,482 
UK Investment Property   130 
Sources: HM Treasury, Debt Management Office, Merrill Lynch, London Stock Exchange, Investment 
Property Databank * Includes non-rated bonds 
 
A hierarchical relationship is likely to develop between the investment advisor, actuary and fund 
manager. The investment advisor determines the strategic asset allocation, based on the 
employer’s attitude to surplus and contribution risks. The actuary takes this strategic asset 
allocation and determines the required contribution rate, based on his calculation of pension 
scheme liabilities. The fund manager is reduced to the subsidiary role of security selection and 
market timing of the general assets that back the surplus in the pension scheme. The strategic 
asset allocation determined by the investment advisor will be implemented passively and at the 
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lowest cost. The length of investment management contracts will be related to the actuarial 
valuation cycle which is typically three years. 
 
Liability-driven performance measurement and attribution replaces the existing performance 
measurement framework in the UK. The minimisation of surplus and contribution risks implies 
that the investment performance of the fund manager will be judged against a scheme-specific or 
customised benchmark that reflects both the employer’s attitude to these risks and the growth rate 
in the liabilities of each particular fund, rather than on relative performance against other fund 
managers. The passively managed components of the pension fund will be judged on the costs of 
implementation. Only the performance of the general assets is measured on a conventional basis 
in future. 
 
The age of alchemy is over.  Pension fund management in the UK is about to enter the scientific 
age. The hunt for correlation begins. 
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Appendix A: The Myners Report – A Summary of Findings and 
Recommendations 
 
The Myners Report (Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review) was published on 
6 March 2001. In introducing his report, Paul Myners said:  
 
Our funded pensions system, our highly-developed equity culture and the 
professionalisation of investment in the UK are an enviable success story. I pay tribute to 
the commitment and dedication of institutions and their advisors in bringing this about. 
Nevertheless, the industry and its decision-taking structures face forbidding challenges: 
an ageing population, unrecognisably different labour markets, shifting employer 
attitudes. In the world we now face, an ever-higher premium is likely to be placed on 
efficiency and flexibility. The review finds that savers’ money is too often being invested in 
ways that do not maximise their interests. It is likely to follow too that capital is being 
inefficiently allocated in the economy. The review sets out a blueprint for change, to drive 
clearer incentives and tougher customer pressures throughout the savings and investment 
industry. 
 
The report identified the following main distortions: 
 
· Pension fund trustees, who are the very centre of the system, are being asked to take 
crucial investment decisions, yet many lack resources and expertise.  They are often 
unsupported by in-house staff, and are rarely paid. 
 
· As a result, the trustees rely heavily on a narrow group of investment consulting (mainly 
actuarial) firms for advice. Such firms are small in number, have a narrow range of 
expertise and little room for specialisation.  Furthermore, their performance is not usually 
assessed or measured. 
 
· A particular consequence of the present structure is that asset allocation (the selection of 
which markets, as opposed to which individual stocks, to invest in) is an under-resourced 
activity. This is especially unfortunate given the weight of academic evidence suggesting 
that these decisions can be critical determinants of investment performance. 
 
· A lack of clarity about objectives at a number of levels. Fund managers are being set 
objectives which, taken together, appear to bear little coherent relationship to the ultimate 
objective of the pension fund, namely to meet its pension obligations. 
 
· Fund managers are often set objectives which give them unnecessary and artificial 
incentives to herd.  So-called peer-group benchmarks, directly incentivising funds to copy 
other funds, remain common.  Risk controls for active managers are increasingly set in 
ways which give them little choice but to cling closely to stock market indices, making 
meaningful active management near- impossible. 
 
· There is also extreme vagueness about the timescales over which fund managers’ 
performance is to be judged. This is a real (but wholly unnecessary) cause of short-
termism in fund managers’ approach to investment. 
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· Fund managers remain unnecessarily reluctant to take an activist stance in relation to 
corporate underperformance, in companies where they own substantial shareholdings, 
even where this would be in their clients’ financ ial interests. 
 
· Finally, an important cost to pension funds, namely broking commission, is subject to 
insufficient scrutiny. Clearer and more rigorous disciplines could be applied to these costs, 
which are substantial. 
 
· In the life insurance industry, competition, though intense, tends not to focus directly on 
investment performance, and this issue needs to be tackled if stronger incentives to 
efficient investment decision-making in the industry are to be created. 
 
The report made a number of proposals to deal with these distortions. The key proposal is the 
introduction of a statement of the principles of institutional investment, incorporating a short set of 
clear principles of investment decision-making.  The idea is modelled on the approach taken on 
corporate governance by the Cadbury (and later) codes.  These principles would apply first to 
pension funds and subsequently to other institutional investors.  As with the Cadbury code, they 
would not be mandatory.  However, where a pension fund chose not to comply with them, it 
would have to explain to its members why not. 
 
The set of principles proposed for defined benefit pension schemes is as follows (as revised in 
the Government’s Response to the Myners Review, October 2001): 
 
· Effective decision-making. Decisions should be taken only by persons or organisations 
with the skills, information and resources necessary to take them effectively. Where 
trustees elect to take investment decisions, they must have sufficient expertise and 
appropriate training to be able to evaluate critically any advice they take. Trustees should 
ensure that they have sufficient in-house staff to support them in their investment 
responsibilities. Trustees should also be paid, unless there are specific reasons to the 
contrary. It is good practice for trustee boards to have an investment subcommittee to 
provide the appropriate focus. Trustees should assess whether they have the right set of 
skills, both individually and collectively, and the right structures and processes to carry out 
their role effectively. They should draw up a forward- looking business plan. The 
Government will give legal effect to this principle by imposing a duty of care on trustees, 
requiring them to be familiar with investment matters when they take investment 
decisions. 
 
· Clear objectives. Trustees should set out an overall investment objective for the fund that: 
 
· represents their best judgement of what is necessary to meet the fund’s liabilities 
given their understanding of the contributions likely to be received from 
employer(s) and employees; and 
 
· takes account of their attitude to risk, specifically their willingness to accept 
underperformance due to market conditions. 
 
Objectives for the overall fund should not be expressed in terms which have no 
relationship to the fund’s liabilities, such as performance relative to other pension funds, 
or to a market index. 
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· Focus on asset allocation. Strategic asset allocation decisions should receive a level of 
attention (and, where relevant, advisory or management  fees) that fully reflect the 
contribution they can make towards achieving the fund’s investment objective. Decision-
makers should consider a full range of investment opportunities, not excluding from 
consideration any major asset class, including private equity. Asset allocation should 
reflect the fund’s own characteristics, not the average allocation of other funds. 
 
· Expert advice. Contracts for actuarial services and investment advice should be opened to 
separate competition. The fund should be prepared to pay sufficient fees for each service 
to attract a broad range of kinds of potential providers. 
 
· Explicit mandates. Trustees should agree with both internal and external investment 
managers an explicit written mandate covering agreement between trustees and managers 
on: 
 
· an objective, benchmark(s) and risk parameters that together with all the other 
mandates are coherent with the fund’s aggregate objective and risk tolerances; 
 
· the manager’s approach in attempting to achieve the objective; and 
 
· clear timescale(s) of measurement and evaluation, such that the mandate will not 
be terminated before the expiry of the evaluation timescale for underperformance 
alone. 
 
The mandate and trust deed and rules should not exclude the use of any set of financia l 
instruments, without clear justification in the light of the specific circumstances of the fund. 
Trustees, or those to whom they have delegated the task, should have a full understanding of the 
transaction-related costs they incur, including commissions. They should understand all the 
options open to them in respect of these costs, and should have an active strategy - whether 
through direct financial incentives or otherwise - for ensuring that these costs are properly 
controlled without jeopardising the fund's other objectives. Trustees should not without good 
reason permit soft commissions to be paid in respect of their fund’s transactions. 
 
· Activism.  The mandate and trust deed should incorporate the principle of the US 
Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletin on activism. Trustees should also ensure that 
managers have an explicit strategy, elucidating the circumstances in which they will 
intervene in a company; the approach they will use in doing so; and how they measure the 
effectiveness of this strategy. The US Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletin 26 on 
activism is as follows: 
 
· The fiduciary act of managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock 
includes the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock. 
 
· The fiduciary obligations of prudence and loyalty to plan participants and 
beneficiaries require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that may 
affect the value of the plan’s investment.  
 
· An investment policy that contemplates activities intended to monitor or influence 
the management of corporations in which the plan owns stock is consistent with a 
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fiduciary’s obligations under ERISA (1974 Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act) when the responsible fiduciary concludes that there is a reasonable 
expectation that activities by the plan alone, or together with other shareholders, 
are likely to enhance the value of the plan’s investment, after taking into account 
the costs involved. Such a reasonable expectation may exist in various 
circumstances, for example, where plan investments in corporate stock are held as 
long-term investments or where a plan may not be able to easily dispose such an 
investment. 
 
· Active monitoring and communication activities would generally concern such 
issues as the independence and expertise of candidates for the corporation ’s board 
of directors and assuring that the board has sufficient information to carry out its 
responsibility to monitor management. Other issues may include such matters as 
consideration of the appropriateness of executive compensation, the corporation’s 
policy regarding mergers and acquisitions, the extent of debt financing and 
capitalisation, the nature of long-term business plans, the corporation’s investment 
in training to develop its workforce, other workplace practices and financial and 
non-financial measures of corporate performance. Active monitoring and 
communication may be carried out through a variety of methods including by 
means of correspondence and meetings with corporate management as well as by 
exercising the legal rights of a shareholder. 
 
 
· Appropriate benchmarks. Trustees should: 
 
· explicitly consider, in consultation with their investment manager(s), whether the 
index benchmarks they have selected are appropriate; in particular, whether 
the.construction of the index creates incentives to follow sub-optimal investment 
strategies; 
 
· if setting limits on divergence from an index, ensure that they reflect the 
approximations involved in index construction and selection; 
 
· consider explicitly for each asset class invested, whether active or passive 
management would be more appropriate given the efficiency, liquidity and level of 
transaction costs in the market concerned; and 
 
· where they believe active management has the potential to achieve higher returns, 
set both targets and risk controls that reflect this, giving the managers the freedom 
to pursue genuinely active strategies. 
 
· Performance measurement. Trustees should arrange for measurement of the performance 
of the fund and make formal assessment of their own procedures and decisions as trustees. 
They should also arrange for a formal assessment of performance and decision-making 
delegated to advisors and managers. 
 
· Transparency. A strengthened Statement of Investment Principles should set out: 
 
· who is taking which decisions and why this structure has been selected; 
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· the fund’s investment objective; 
 
· the fund’s planned asset allocation strategy, including projected Investment returns 
on each asset class, and how the strategy has been arrived at; 
 
· the mandates given to all advisors and managers; and 
 
· the nature of the fee structures in place for all advisors and managers, and why this 
set of structures has been selected. 
 
· Regular reporting. Trustees should publish their Statement of Investment Principles and 
the results of their monitoring of advisors and managers. They should send key 
information from these annually to members of these funds, including an explanation of 
why the fund has chosen to depart from any of these principles. 
 
      The following principles are proposed for defined contribution schemes: 
 
· Effective decision-making. Decisions should only be taken by persons or organisations 
with the skills, information and resources necessary to take them effectively. Where 
trustees elect to take investment decisions, they must have sufficient expertise and 
appropriate training to be able to evaluate critically any advice they take. Where scheme 
members are given a choice regarding investment issues, sufficient information should be 
given to them to allow an appropriate choice to be made. Trustees should ensure that they 
have sufficient in-house staff to support them in their investment responsibilities. Trustees 
should also be paid, unless there are specific reasons to the contrary. It is good practice for 
trustee boards to have an investment subcommittee to provide appropriate focus. Trustees 
should assess whether they have the right set of skills, both individually and collectively, 
and the right structures and processes to carry out their role effectively. They should draw 
up a forward- looking business plan. 
 
· Clear objectives.  In selecting funds to offer as options to scheme members, trustees 
should: 
 
· consider the investment objectives, expected returns, risks and other 
relevant characteristics of each fund, so that they can publish their assessments of 
these characteristics for each selected fund; and 
 
· satisfy themselves that they have taken their members’ circumstances 
into account, and that they are offering a wide enough range of options to satisfy 
the reasonable return and risk combinations appropriate for most members. 
 
· Focus on asset allocation. Strategic asset allocation (for example for default and lifestyle 
options) should receive a level of attention (and, where relevant, advisory or management 
fees) that fully reflects the contribution they can make to achieving investment objectives. 
Decision-makers should consider a full range of investment opportunities, not excluding from 
consideration any major asset class, including private equity. 
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· Choice of default fund. Where a fund is offering a default option to members through a 
customised combination of funds, trustees should make sure that an investment objective is set 
for the option, including expected returns and risks. 
 
· Expert advice. Contracts for investment advice should be open to competition, and fee rather 
than commission based. The scheme should be prepared to pay sufficient fees to attract a 
broad range of kinds of potential providers. 
 
· Explicit mandates. Trustees should communicate to members, for each fund offered by the 
scheme: 
 
· the investment objective for the fund, its benchmark(s) and risk parameters; and 
 
· the manager’s approach in attempting to achieve the objective. 
 
These should also be discussed with the fund manager concerned, as should a clear timescale(s) of 
measurement and evaluation, with the understanding that the fund mandate will not be terminated 
before the expiry of the evaluation timescale for underperformance alone. Trustees, or those to 
whom they have delegated the task, should have a full understanding of the transaction-related 
costs they incur, including commissions. They should understand all the options open to them in 
respect of these costs, and should have an active strategy - whether through direct financial 
incentives or otherwise - for ensuring that these costs are properly controlled without jeopardising 
the fund's other objectives. Trustees should not without good reason permit soft commissions to 
be paid in respect of their fund’s transactions. 
 
· Activism. The mandate and trust deed should incorporate the principle of the US 
Department of Labor Interpretative Bulletin on activism. Managers should have an explicit 
strategy, elucidating the circumstances in which they will intervene in a company; the 
approach they will use in doing so; and how they measure the effectiveness of this 
strategy. 
 
· Appropriate benchmarks. Trustees should: 
 
· explicitly consider, in consultation with their investment manager(s), whe ther the 
index benchmarks they have selected are appropriate; in particular, whether the 
construction of the index creates incentives to follow sub-optimal investment 
strategies; 
 
· if setting limits on divergence from an index, ensure that they reflect the 
approximations involved in index construction and selection; 
 
· consider explicitly for each asset class invested, whether active or passive 
management would be more appropriate given the efficiency, liquidity and level of 
transaction costs in the market concerned; and 
 
· where they believe active management has the potential to achieve higher returns, 
set both targets and risk controls that reflect this, giving managers the freedom to 
pursue genuinely active strategies. 
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· Performance measurement.  Trustees should arrange for measurement of the performance 
of the funds and make formal assessment of their own procedures and decisions as 
trustees. They should also arrange for a formal assessment of performance and decision-
making delegated to advisors and managers. 
 
 
· Transparency. A strengthened Statement of Investment Principles should set out: 
 
· who is taking which decisions and why this structure has been selected; 
 
· each fund option’s investment characteristics; 
 
· the default option’s investment characteristics, and why it has been selected; 
 
· the agreements with all advisors and managers; and 
 
· the nature of the fee structures in place for all advisors and managers, and why this 
set of structures has been selected. 
 
· Regular reporting. Trustees should publish their Statement of Investment Principles and 
the results of their monitoring of advisors and managers. They should send key 
information from these annually to members of these funds, including an explanation of 
why the fund has chosen to depart from any of these principles. 
 
In commenting on the proposed set of principles, Paul Myners said: ‘The principles may seem 
little more than common sense. In a way they are – yet they certainly do not describe the status 
quo.  Following them would require substantial change in decision-making behaviour and 
structures.’ The report called for the industry to adopt the principles voluntarily within two years, 
but if necessary the government should legislate to require disclosure against them.  The 
Government expects pension funds to disclose publicly their compliance with these principles on 
a voluntary basis.  Insured schemes are excluded from the set of principles and other small 
schemes can explain why they have not implemented a particular principle (e.g., cost of 
compliance). 
 
 
The review made a series of other proposals.  The main ones relate to: 
 
· Minimum Funding Requirement. The replacement of the MFR with a regime based of 
transparency and disclosure, under which pension funds would report publicly on the 
current financial state of the fund and on future investment plans. Each year, every defined 
benefit pension fund would be required to publish: 
 
· the current value of its assets and in what asset classes they were invested; 
 
· the assumptions used to determine its liabilities; 
 
· planned future contributions; 
 
· its planned asset allocation for the following year or years; 
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· the assumed returns and assumed volatilities of those returns for each asset class 
sufficient to meet the liabilities; 
 
· a justification by the trustees of the reasonableness of both their asset allocation 
and the investment returns assumed in the light of the circumstances of the fund 
and of the sponsor; and  
 
· an explanation of the implications of the volatility of the investment values for 
possible underfunding, and a justification by trustees of why this level of volatility 
is judged to be acceptable. 
 
· Pension fund surpluses. The Law Commission to be asked whether it can suggest greater 
legal clarity around the ownership of surplus pension fund assets. The Finance Act 2001 
reduced the rate of tax on distributed pension fund surpluses from 40% to 35%. 
 
· Private equity. Investment in private equity should benefit from the framework set out by 
the principles and from the replacement of the MFR. The review also made a number of 
proposals which take account of the special nature of private equity as an asset class for 
institutional investors, including changes to the maximum number of partners in a limited 
partnership and changes to the taxation of investments in limited partnerships. It also calls 
for the British Venture Capital Association to take action to improve transparency and 
disclosure about issues such as investment returns and compensation.  The Government 
announced the introduction of Regional Venture Capital Funds.  
 
· Compensation. The level of compensation provided by the Pensions Compensation Board 
for non-pensioner members should be increased to cover not simply the 90 per cent of 
MFR liabilities as at present, but something closer to the cost of securing members’ 
accrued rights (or the amount of the loss, whichever is the lesser). 
 
· Independent custody. There should be a statutory requirement for funds to have 
independent custody of assets. 
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Appendix B: Illustrative Statement of Investment Principles 
 
The Pensions Act 1995 requires trustees to prepare, publish and maintain a statement of 
investment principles (SIP) that governs the selection and management of their scheme’s 
investments.  In preparing the SIP the trustees are required to take written advice from ‘a person 
who is reasonably believed by the trustees to be qualified by his ability in and practical experience 
of financial matters and to have the appropriate knowledge and experience of the management of 
the investment of such schemes’.  However, they are not compelled to act on the basis of that 
advice. They must also consult the employer, but do not need the consent of the employer to 
undertake specific investments. 
 
Trustees should publish the SIP and the results of their monitoring of advisors and managers and 
send them annually to members of the fund. The Statement should explain why a fund has 
decided to depart from any of these principles.  Section 35 of the Act specifies the issues that must 
be covered in the SIP. 
 
;   Investment Objectives of the Pension Fund 
 
The trustees’ duty is to act in the best financial interests of scheme members and to choose the 
level of contributions and asset allocation most appropriate for securing in full the benefits 
promised by the scheme, taking account of the employer’s attitude towards the volatility of 
contributions. 
 
The trustees have ascertained that the employer values a high degree of stability in the 
contribution rates into the scheme 
 
Accordingly, the investment advisors appointed by the trustees to determine the pension fund’s 
strategic asset allocation are instructed to: 
 
· Give primary consideration to the liability-matching prospects of any asset class they 
recommend. 
 
· Take account of the employer’s wish for highly stable contribution rates. 
 
In turn, the investment managers appointed by the trustees are set the following investment 
performance targets: 
 
· To implement the strategic asset allocation recommended by the investment advisors and 
approved by the trustees at the lowest cost to the scheme. 
 
· In respect of non- liability-driven assets held in the scheme: to exceed the benchmark 
return on each asset class by X% p.a. over the term of the investment mandate. 
 
 
;  Mandates and Fee Structures 
Who Takes Decisions and Why This Structure Has Been Selected 
The trustees retain overall power of investment in relation to the fund but may from time to time 
delegate to an investment committee the power to decide the investment policy of the fund. The 
investment committee consists of trustees who have been trained in investment matters (although 
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none is currently qualified as an ‘approved person’ to give explicit investment advice).  The 
investment committee is required to notify the trustees of its decisions concerning the investment 
policy of the fund. Any changes in the investment policy shall be notified to the trustees on a 
quarterly basis. 
 
· The investments of the fund are currently managed by one index tracking manager (ABC), 
one specialist property manager (DEF) and one discretionary balanced manager (HIJ). The 
role of the index tracking manager is to implement the strategic asset allocation at the 
lowest cost.  The role of the specialist property manager is to select the property portfolio 
both for the purpose of implementing the strategic asset allocation and to beat the property 
benchmark return by X% p.a. over the term of the investment mandate.  The role of the 
discretionary balanced manager is to select the non-property, non- liability-driven assets 
and to beat the benchmark return on each asset class by X% p.a. over the term of the 
investment mandate.   
 
 
The Mandates Given to All Advisors and Managers 
 
The scheme is advised by KLM Consulting Actuaries Ltd and NOP Investment Advisors Ltd.  
KLM are ins tructed to conduct triennial asset- liability studies and NOP are instructed to advise on 
the fund’s strategic asset allocation in the light of these studies. Formerly KLM provided both 
actuarial and investment advice services, but the trustees decided to appoint a separate investment 
advisor. 
 
The investment performance target for the index tracking manager (ABC) is to generate a tracking 
error of less than X% p.a. on each of the following indices A,B,C,…and operating costs of less 
than Y% p.a. over the three-year investment mandate.  
 
The investment performance target for the specialist property manager (DEF) is to beat the D 
Property Index by X% p.a. over the three-year investment mandate.  
The investment performance target for the discretionary balanced manager is to beat each of the 
following indices A,B,C,… by X% p.a. over the three-year investment mandate.  
 
QRS Performance Measurement Services Ltd measure the performance of the fund on a quarterly 
basis.   
 
 
The Nature of the Fee Structures in Place for All Advisors and Managers, and Why This Set of Structures 
Has Been Selected 
 
ABC receives an annual fee of X% of the value of the assets that ABC manages, payable quarterly 
in arrears. The low fee reflects the low-cost nature of index-tracking. 
 
DEF and HIJ receive an annual fee of X% of the value of the assets that each manage plus a 
performance-related bonus of XX% of the product of the value of the assets and the return in 
excess of the benchmark, payable quarterly in arrears.  If the excess return is negative during any 
quarter, the fee payable to the fund manager is reduced accordingly. These performance-related 
fees reflect the active nature of the investment mandates and provide an appropriate incentive to 
beat their target without taking on excessive risks. 
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KLM, NOP and QRS receive an annual fee of £X, £Y and £Z, respectively, payable quarterly in 
arrears.  The fixed fee reflects the commoditised service provided. 
 
;  Policy on Selecting Investments 
Need for Diversification of Investments 
The trustees are aware of the role of diversification in helping to reduce the volatility in the 
overall value of the fund’s investments without sacrificing investment performance. 
 
Suitability of Investment Categories Proposed and Individual Investments 
The trustees are also aware of the importance of selecting investments whose returns are highly 
correlated with fluctuations in the value of the liabilities.  Given that the liabilities are 
denominated in sterling, the trustees are aware that the bulk of the assets will also be denominated 
in sterling.  
 
How Trustees Have Obtained and Considered Proper Advice Given in Writing by a Suitably Qualified 
Investment Advisor  
The statement has been agreed by the trustees on the basis of written advice from the investment 
committee and the scheme actuary following consultation with NOP Investment Advisors Ltd  
and the employer. 
 
How Often the Trustees Obtain Revised Advice on the Suitability of Investments 
The trustees review the statement at least every three years in the light of each triennial actuarial 
valuation.  
 
How the Trustees Ensure that the Investment Manager Will Make Decisions in Line with the SIP  
The investment committee monitors compliance with this statement at least annually and obtains 
confirmation from the investment managers that they have acted in a way that is consistent with 
the principles.  
 
The Extent (If Any) to Which Social, Environmental and Ethical Considerations are Taken into Account in 
the Selection, Retention and Realisation of Investments 
The trustees pay regard to social, ethical and environmental considerations in the selection, 
retention and realisation of fund investments to the extent that is consistent with their legal duties 
to do so. The trustees have adopted a policy of active engagement with those companies in which 
the fund invests concerning the ethical, environmental and social policies pursued by those 
companies.  The trustees are keen to promote those policies that will both meet best practice in 
these areas and protect and enhance the value of the fund's investments in those companies. 
 
The Extent (If Any) to Which Rights (Including Voting Rights) Attaching to Investments are Exercised 
The trustees place great emphasis on the proper corporate governance of companies in which the 
fund invests. The trustees have adopted the principles of the US Department of Labor 
Interpretative Bulletin on activism. Votes are cast where appropriate on the basis of these 
principles on resolutions at the general meetings of all UK and overseas companies in which the 
fund has investments. 
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The Need to Respect the Scheme’s Funding Standard 
At the last triennial valuation as at 31 March 20XX, the scheme’s funding level exceeded the 
scheme’s chosen funding standard as specified in the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme-
Specific Funding Standard and Actuarial Valuations) Regulations 200X.  The trustees aim to 
maintain a funding level above the scheme’s funding standard on a continuous basis.  
 
 
;   Policy on Managing Investments and Monitoring Performance 
 
Kinds of Investments 
· Listed securities 
 
Investment managers are permitted to invest, without the prior approval of the chairman of the 
investment committee, in investment-grade securities listed on a recognised or designated 
investment exchange. Investment in non- investment-grade securities listed on a recognised or 
designated investment exchange require the prior approval of the chairman of the investment 
committee. 
 
· Unlisted securities and private equity 
 
Investment managers are permitted to invest, subject to the prior approval of the chairman of the 
investment committee, in unlisted securities and private equity. 
 
· Stock lending 
 
The trustees are authorised by the scheme rules to participate in stock lending. Any stock lending 
programme in which the fund participates must provide for all loans to be fully pre-collateralised 
and be approved by the investment committee on legal advice. 
 
· Derivatives 
 
The discretionary balanced manager is permitted to use derivatives solely for the purposes of 
efficient portfo lio management and the reduction of risk. 
 
· Underwriting 
 
The discretionary balanced manager is permitted to underwrite issues provided it is prepared to 
hold all the stock which it underwrites. 
 
Balance Between Different Kinds of Investments 
The investment  committee sets guidelines for the strategic asset allocation of the total fund within 
which the investment managers, taken as a whole, are required to operate. The investment 
committee reviews these guidelines quarterly. The guidelines set for strategic asset allocation are 
consistent with the investment committee’s views on the appropriate balance between risk and 
return and have due regard to the liabilities of the scheme. 
 
The total investment in each broad asset class is determined by the investment advisor under its 
delegated authority within the above guidelines set by the investment committee after 
consideration of: 
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· the scheme’s chosen funding standard as specified in the Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Scheme-Specific Funding Standard and Actuarial Valuations) Regulations 200X, and 
 
· long-term funding solvency and the employer’s willingness to support the pension scheme 
in the long term.  
 
Risk  
General 
There are two key risks that must be taken into account: 
 
· surplus risk: the risk of a shortfall in the value of the pension scheme’s assets in relation to 
its liabilities 
 
· contribution risk: the volatility over time of contributions into the scheme 
 
These risks are managed by choosing the contribution rate and strategic asset allocation to 
minimise the following Loss function  = Surplus Risk + ´l Contribution Risk, where l  shows the 
relative importance of minimising contribution risk in comparison with minimising surplus risk. 
The trustees have determined that the employer values a stable pattern of contributions into the 
scheme.  Surplus risk is minimised by choosing assets which are highly correlated with the growth 
over time in liabilities. 
 
Individual securities are included in the pension fund on account of the high correlations between 
changes in their values and the growth in liabilities. However, these individual securities are also 
risky in their own right since they represent claims on risky investments that can fail. 
 
Listed securities 
Risk will be managed by requiring fund managers to hold a diversified spread of investments that 
are reviewed on a regular basis by the investment committee. 
In addition, the following constraints will apply: 
 
· No more than 5% of the total fund by market value can be invested in one company (at the 
date of purchase) 
 
· No more than 10% of the total fund by market value can be invested in companies in any 
one industry (at the date of purchase) 
 
· No more than 5% of the total fund by market value can be invested in unlisted securities or 
private equity (at the date of purchase); all such investments require the prior approval of 
the chairman of the investment committee.  
 
· No more than 10% of the market capitalisation of any one company (at the date of 
purchase) 
 
· No more than 2% of the total fund can be invested in cash form with any one financial 
institution. 
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The fund’s assets are held by an independent custodian. 
 
Stock lending 
The trustees participate only in stock lending programmes with a high degree of risk mitigation.  
The trustees have concluded that the risks associated with such programmes are not qualitatively 
different from those of other market operations and are justified in the light of the return to the 
scheme in terms of the annual stock lending fees generated. 
 
Derivatives 
The current limit is 10% of funds under management for the discretionary balanced manager.     
 
Assumed returns on investments 
The assumed real returns on investments are given in the last column of Table B.1. 
 
 
 
Table B.1: Benchmark Asset Allocation and Assumed Real Investment Returns  
 Asset Allocation  
Asset Class  Actual 31 March 200X Benchmark Assumed Real Return  
UK Large Cap Listed Equities 60% 45% 4% 
UK Small Cap Listed Equities 7% 1% 4% 
UK Unlisted and Private Equity 1% 0.5% 4% 
International Equities 2% 0.5% 4% 
UK Index-Linked Bonds 13% 15% 2.5% 
UK Fixed-Income Bonds 8% 5% 2.5%
International Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
3% 10% 2.5% 
Property 3% 15% 2.5% 
Cash 3% 8% 1% 
 100% 100% 2.4% 
Source: NOP Investment Advisors Ltd 
 
These are based on an examination of historical experience over the last 50 years. Historically, the 
real returns on some asset categories, such as equities, have been much higher than the returns that 
have been assumed in the table.  However, the investment advisors have advised that such high 
returns cannot be expected in the future. Increasing global competition will tend to lower equity 
returns in all countries. The advisors believe that the real returns on the asset classes that can be 
expected in future are those given here. 
 
The real return on equities is expected to be 4% and this return is expected to exceed that on all 
other assets, except cash, by 1.5 percentage points (this difference is known as the ‘equity risk 
premium’). The real return on property and bonds is expected to be 2.5%, while the return on cash 
is expected to be 1%. These figures form the basis of the asset- liability study. 
 
The Fund’s Planned Asset Allocation Strategy and How the Strategy Has Been Arrived At 
The second column of Table B.1 shows the actua l asset allocation of the pension fund as at 31 
March 200X.  This asset allocation is heavily biased towards equities, especially UK equities, and 
bonds, especially index- linked bonds.  This asset allocation is currently very similar to that of 
other pension funds in the UK. 
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In accordance with the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme-Specific Funding Standard and 
Actuarial Valuations) Regulations 200X, the pension scheme has introduced a scheme-specific 
funding standard.  This requires the pension fund to invest in assets that match as closely as 
possible the liabilities of the scheme in terms of key features of the liabilities, such as the way that 
they change over time in response to earnings growth, changing interest rates and demographic 
factors.  
 
Following the introduction of these regulations, the scheme actuary, on the advice of NOP 
Investment Advisors, has established a new benchmark asset allocation which is listed in the third 
column of Table B.1. The new benchmark involves a radical switch away from domestic equities 
and bonds towards property, cash and international bonds.  This switch will take place over the 
next 12 months. 
 
 
The funds will be allocated to the investment managers in the following proportions: 
 
· ABC (index tracking) – 75% 
 
· DEF (specialist property) – 15% 
 
· HIJ (discretionary balanced) – 10% 
 
These proportions fluctuate as a result of stock market movements and cash allocation.   
 
Cash flows from contributions and investment income are normally allocated to the investment 
managers in the same proportions: 
 
· ABC (index tracking) – 75% 
 
· DEF (specialist property) – 15% 
 
· HIJ (discretionary balanced) – 10% 
 
The cash allocation is reviewed and approved by the investment committee on a quarterly basis. 
 
If there are significant departures from the asset allocation recommended each quarter by the 
investment committee, the investment specialists on the investment committee will be notified. In 
this way market movements and asset allocation shifts are monitored and any desired changes are 
approved by the chairman of the investment committee after consultation with the investment 
specialists on the investment committee and NOP Investment Advisors. 
 
Realisation of Investments  
The asset- liability study indicates that the scheme has a below-average maturity profile and a 
likely positive cash flow for the next 10 years.  This makes it unlikely that the fund will need to 
realise investments to meet liabilities in the short term. 
 
Monitoring Performance 
The performance of the fund and of each investment manager is measured quarterly by QRS 
Performance Measurement Services Ltd. The performance of the investment managers and the 
fund is reported quarterly to the investment committee. 
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The internal auditor and chief investment officer visit the investment managers to check the 
quality and effectiveness of procedures on a regular basis.  
 
The presentation of investment performance data is in line with the UK Investment Performance 
Standard (UKIPS). 
 
Reasons for Any Departure from the Principles 
There are currently no departures from the SIP.  
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Appendix C: Illustrative Transparency Statement 
;  Asset Values and the Current Asset Allocation 
The current value of the assets in your pension fund (as of 31 March 200X) is £X.  The second 
column of Table C.1 shows how these assets are currently allocated to the asset classes given in 
the first column. Your pension fund is currently invested very heavily in equities, especially UK 
equities, and bonds, especially index-linked bonds.  This asset allocation is currently very similar 
to that of other pension funds in the UK. 
 
 
Table C.6: Current and Future Asset Allocations of Your Pension 
Fund 
Asset Class  Current Future  
UK Large Cap Listed Equities 60% 45% 
UK Small Cap Listed Equit ies 7% 1% 
UK Unlisted and Private Equity 1% 0.5% 
International Equities 2% 0.5% 
UK Index-Linked Bonds 13% 15% 
UK Fixed-Income Bonds 8% 5% 
International Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
3% 10% 
Property 3% 15% 
Cash 3% 8% 
 100% 100% 
Source: NOP Investment Advisors Ltd 
 
;  Liabilities 
The liabilities of the fund are the future pension payments to you and other members of the 
scheme.  The Scheme Actuary has placed a value of £Y on the scheme liabilities.  In order to 
determine this value, the Scheme Actuary had to make the following assumptions: 
 
· Members’ contributions: 6% of their pensionable pay.  
 
· Employer’s contributions: 14% of pensionable pay. 
 
· Earnings growth: 4.5% a year (or 2% above inflation). 
 
· Deferred pension increases before retirement : 2.5% a year. 
 
· Pension increases in retirement : 2.5% a year. 
 
· Discount rate for liabilities: 5% a year (or 2.5% above inflation). 
 
· Demographic assumptions: Mortality of scheme members is assumed to be in line with 
that of the standard mortality tables PMA92 (for men) and PFA92 (for women) published 
by the Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, projected as appropriate for the year of birth of 
the member.  
 
· Scheme size: there is no change over time in the number of active members of the 
scheme. 
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These assumptions are all the same as used for the last assessment. 
 
The Scheme Actuary has made an assessment of the likely level of pension payments in future 
years on the basis of the above assumptions, together with more detailed assumptions on matters 
such as the proportions of company employees leaving and retiring from the scheme at each age 
and the pattern of new entrants to the scheme. More details on the actuarial assessment are 
available from the Secretary to the Trustees. 
 
;  Planned Future Contributions  
 
As explained below, the Trustees are planning major changes to your pension fund’s asset 
holdings. However, on the basis of the investment performance that the Trustees’ investment 
advisors expect to achieve following the change in asset holdings, there will be no need to change 
the contributions into your scheme. The member’s contribution rate will remain fixed at 6% of 
pensionable pay and the employer’s contribution rate will remain fixed at 14% of pensionable 
pay. 
 
;  Planned Asset Allocation for the Following Years  
 
Recent legislation has required your pension scheme to introduce a scheme-specific funding 
standard.  This means that your pension fund must invest in assets that match as closely as 
possible the liabilities of the scheme in terms of key features of the liabilities, such as the way that 
they change over time in response to earnings growth, changing interest rates and demographic 
factors. This in turn means that your pension fund’s assets must be chosen specifically to suit your 
scheme, irrespective of the way in which other pension funds invest. 
 
Following the introduction of this legislation, the Scheme Actuary has established a new asset 
allocation suitable for your scheme. This is given in the third column of Table C.1. The figures 
indicate a radical switch away from domestic equities and bonds towards property, cash and 
international bonds.  This switch will take place over the next 12 months. 
 
;  Assumed Returns and Volatilities on Assets  
 
The assumed returns and assumed volatilities of those returns for each asset class sufficient to 
meet the liabilities are presented in Table C.2. 
 
The real return means the return after taking inflation into account.   
 
Standard deviation measures the riskiness of a particular asset class. The simplest way to explain 
standard deviation is in terms of the so-called ‘1- in-6 rule’. There is a 1-in-6 chance that the 
realised return on an asset in a particular year will be less than one standard deviation below the 
mean return and there is a 1-in-6 chance that the realised return on an asset in a particular year 
will be more than one standard deviation above the mean return. So, for example, there is a 1- in-6 
chance that the realised real return on property over the course of the next year will be below -5% 
and a 1- in-6 chance that it will be above 15%.  
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Table C.2: Assumed Returns and Volatilities on Assets  
 
Asset Class  
 
Real 
Return + 
Standard  
Deviation* 
Correlation with 
Liabilities* 
UK Large Cap Listed Equities 4% 27% -5% 
UK Small Cap Listed Equities 4% 32% -8% 
UK Unlisted and Private Equity 4% 38% -35% 
International Equities 4% 21% -5% 
UK Index-Linked Bonds 2.5% 7% -7% 
UK Fixed-Income Bonds 2.5% 14% -34% 
International Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
2.5% 17% -2% 
Property 2.5% 10% 36% 
Cash 1% 2% 21% 
Source: Table 1 (estimates for UK small cap listed equity and UK unlisted and private equity) 
+ Return in excess of inflation * See Appendix D 
 
 
Correlation measures the degree to which two variables move together. The degree of correlation 
lies between –1 and +1. Your pension fund is planning to invest in assets with the highest 
correlations with the growth in the fund’s pension liabilities, which, in turn, is related to earnings 
growth.  As you can see from the last column of Table C.2 this means property, cash and 
international fixed- income bonds. 
 
;  Justification of Assumptions Used  
 
In the interests of transparency, the Trustees must provide you with an explanation of the 
reasonableness of both the investment returns assumed and the asset allocation in the light of the 
circumstances of the fund and of the employer, XYZ Ltd.  
 
Table C.2 was prepared by the Trustees’ investment advisors. It was based on asset performance 
over the last half century, but also took into account factors that the investment advisors thought 
would be important in the future.  
 
Table C.3 shows the actual asset performance over the last half century.  Historically, the real 
returns on some asset categories, such as equities, have been much higher than the returns that 
have been assumed in Table C.2.  However, the Trustees’ investment advisors have advised that 
such high returns cannot be expected in the future.  Increasing global competition will tend to 
lower equity returns in all countries. The advisors believe that the real returns on the asset classes 
that can be expected in future are those given in the second column of Table C.2. The real return 
on equities is expected to be 4% and this return is expected to exceed that on all other assets, 
except cash, by 1.5 percentage points (this difference is known as the ‘equity risk premium’). The 
real return on property and bonds is expected to be 2.5%, while the return on cash (which means 
money market instruments, such as Treasury bills, rather than loose change) is expected to be 1%.  
 
The investment advisors have  advised that the historical standard deviations and correlations with 
liabilities given in Table C.3 should be used in the future. They believe the world’s stock markets 
are entering a period of uncertainty in the near term that justifies maintaining the risk factors 
(standard deviations) on all asset classes at their historical levels, despite lowering the anticipated 
returns on some of the more volatile asset classes. 
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Table C.3: Historical Performance of Asset Classes Over the Last Fifty 
Years 
 
Asset Class 
Mean 
Real Return + 
Standard 
Deviation* 
Correlation with 
Liabilities* 
UK Large Cap Listed Equities 10% 27% -5% 
UK Small Cap Listed Equities 6% 32% -8% 
UK Unlisted and Private Equity 12% 38% -35% 
International Equities 9% 21% -5% 
UK Index-Linked Bonds 4% 7% -7% 
UK Fixed-Income Bonds 2% 14% -34% 
International Fixed-Income 
Bonds 
2% 17% -2% 
Property 5% 10% 36% 
Cash 1% 2% 21% 
Source: Table 1 (estimates for UK small cap listed equity and UK unlisted and private equity) 
+ Return in excess of inflation * See Appendix D 
 
The Trustees’ investment advisors believe that it is sensible to use rather conservative estimates of 
future performance. They also recommend examining long periods (i.e., 50 years) of previous 
performance before reaching their conclus ions about future performance.  Other pension funds 
take into account historical performance data for periods as short as 20 years, but the investment 
advisors believe that the last 20 years was such an exceptionally bullish period in stock market 
history that this period by itself would provide a very inaccurate indicator of future performance.  
Accordingly and given the very long time frame of pension fund investment, the investment 
advisors prefer to examine longer periods of performance data. 
 
Your pens ion fund is about to implement a major shift in its asset allocation away from equities 
and domestic bonds and towards property, cash and international bonds. This switch is based on 
an asset-liability study conducted by the Scheme Actuary with advice from the investment 
advisor, the purpose of which was to find asset classes that minimised both: 
 
· the likelihood of a shortfall in the value of the pension fund compared with the value of 
the liabilities and  
 
· the volatility of the employer’s contributions into the scheme.  
 
The best asset classes for achieving this are those that are most highly correlated with the growth 
rate over time in your earnings, since this is the most important single factor determining the 
growth rate in your pension scheme’s liabilities.  In addition, your employer wants to reduce the 
risk of having to put large sums of money into your pension fund in order to keep it solvent.  
 
The Trustees believe that, with the asset allocation given in the last column of Table C.1 and with 
total contributions of 20% of pensionable earnings, your pension fund is both secure and 
adequately funded.  
 
;  Implications of the Volatilities of Investment Values 
 
Although the Trustees believe that your pension fund is both secure and adequately funded, the 
future can still bring surprises.  Three key risks are that: 
 
· assets underperform the returns assumed in the second column of Table C.2  
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· asset return volatility is greater than assumed in the third column of Table C.2, and 
 
· correlations between asset returns and liability growth are lower than assumed in the 
fourth column of Table C.2.   
 
Sustained underperformance in equity would have serious consequences for the funding adequacy 
of your pension scheme. For example, the Scheme Actuary has estimated that if the real return on 
equity fell from the 4% assumed to 3%, the funding level would fall to 95% after 10 years. To 
restore the funding level to 100% would require the employer to make a deficiency payment into 
your pension fund equal to 6% of your current earnings.  
 
Similarly, increases in asset return volatility would increase the likelihood of the employer having 
to make deficiency payments as would lower correlations between asset returns and liability 
growth.  
 
Nevertheless the Trustees believe that the asset allocation that your pension fund is planning to 
switch into is the best one for minimising the risk of serious underperformance. The Trustees will 
continuously monitor your fund’s performance and make any changes necessary to the asset 
allocation in response to changing circumstances in order to maintain a high degree of security in 
your pension scheme. 
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Appendix D: Standard Deviation, Value-at-Risk and Correlation 
 
Standard deviation is a commonly used measure of the volatility or risk of a variable. It measures 
the extent to which the dispersion of a random variable is concentrated around its mean or average 
value: if the degree of concentration is high, so that realised values of the variable are always 
close to the mean, then the standard deviation will be low, and vice versa.  
 
The formula for calculating the standard deviation of N values of a variable ix  is as follows: 
Standard deviation = 
1
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1
2
-
-å =
N
xx
N
i i  
where 
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==
å =
N
x
x
N
i i1 the mean or average of the set of N variables 
=å =
N
i 1
sum over a set of variables from 1 to N. 
 
Standard deviation is best illustrated in terms of the 1-in-6 and 1- in-40 rules as shown in Chart 
D.1. Chart D.1 shows the familiar bell-shaped curve of the standard normal distribution which has 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.  
 
Suppose that a time-varying random variable is generated by this distribution with annual 
realisations of the variable. There is then a 1-in-6 chance that the realised value of this variable in 
a particular year will be less than one standard deviation below the mean. In other words the area 
beneath the curve to the left of –1 in the figure is 1/6th of the total area under the curve. The figure 
–1 is also sometimes known as the 1-in-6 value-at-risk.  Another way of expressing this is that in 
1 year in 6, we expect to see values less than one standard deviation below the mean. Similarly, 
there is a 1- in-40 chance that the value of the variable in a particular year (or in one year out of 
every 40) will be less than two standard deviations below the mean, i.e., less than –2 in Chart D.1 
(this figure is also sometimes known as the 1- in-40 value-at-risk).  
 
Correlation measures the degree to which two variables move together. The degree of correlation 
lies between –1 and +1. If two variables are perfectly positively correlated (with a correlation 
coefficient of +1), they will move exactly in line with each other: for every one unit rise in one of 
the variables there will be precisely a one-unit rise in the other variable. If two variables are 
perfectly negatively correlated (with a correlation coefficient of –1), they will move in exactly 
opposite directions: for every one unit rise in one of the variables there will be precisely a one unit 
fall in the other variable.  If two variables have a correlation coefficient of zero, they are said to be 
uncorrelated: the movement of one variable is unrelated to the movement in the other variable. 
Correlation coefficients lying between 0 and 1 indicate positive but less than perfect correlation 
between pairs of variables, the weaker the positive correlation the closer the coefficient will be to 
0 and vice versa. A similar result holds for negative correlation coefficients lying between 0 and –
1.  
 
The formula for calculating the correlation between N pairs of values of variables ix  and iy  is as 
follows: 
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Chart D.1:  The 1-in-6 and 1-in-40 Values -at-Risk with the Standard Normal 
Distribution 
Mean = 0, Standard deviation = 1
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Source: Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974, Fig. 9, p. 108) 
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Appendix E: The Optimal Strategic Asset Allocation 
 
The exercise of minimising the loss function in (4) has to be conducted on a regular basis 
(annually or, more commonly, triennially).  This is to ensure both that the scheme is always 
adequately funded (i.e., Surplus = 0) and that the strategic asset allocation always matches the 
volatility of the liabilities (Surplus Risk is minimised).  
 
In the case where the pension fund is planning to have neither a surplus nor a deficit at the end of 
the control period and where the standard deviations of the retention, annuity and discount factors 
in (6) are zero, the asset holdings that minimise the loss function in (4) are given by: 
 
[ ] )()( 1 tt zOSq -+= l          (E.1) 
 
where 
 
· )))(()1(()()()( µ1?z +-++= tWtLtWtHt gl  
 
· )1()1)()(()(),1()( +-+-+= tTgtTTAtaTtDtH  
 
· =+ )1(tL liabilities at age t + 1 
 
· =g  contribution rate as a proportion of current earnings W(t) necessary to give a zero 
surplus at the end of the control period 
 
· =)(tq a vector of N asset holdings for a pension scheme member aged t, with typical 
element )(tqi  
 
· =+ )( µ1 a vector of N gross expected returns on the above asset holdings with typical 
element )1( im+  
 
· =?  a vector of N covariances between the above asset holdings and earnings growth with 
typical element ir  
 
· =S an N x N matrix of covariances between the returns on the asset holdings with typical 
element ijs  
 
· =O an N x N matrix of gross expected return cross-products with typical element 
)1)(1( ji mm ++ . 
 
The optimal portfolio is biased towards assets that are highly correlated with earnings (? ), and 
biased against volatile assets (as measured by S ). 
 
It should be clear from (2) that as the pension fund matures (i.e., as the pension scheme member 
approaches retirement), the revaluation, retention and discount factors, R(t,T), P(t,T) and D(t,T), 
converge in size towards unity and so the value of the liabilities becomes dominated by the size of 
the annuity factor, A(T). In other words, whatever the initial asset allocation of the pension fund, 
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the surplus risk minimisation exercise will indicate that the pension fund as it matures should 
move its asset allocation towards the asset class that matches most closely the pension fund’s 
obligation to pay annuities, namely index- linked bonds. Samuelson (1989) has called this dynamic 
investment strategy age-phasing and it is now more commonly known as lifestyle fund 
management: the strategy is examined in more detail in Blake (1998a).  
 
